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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems control and monitor
the electric power grid, water treatment facilities, oil and gas pipelines, railways and other
Critical Infrastructures (CIs). In recent years, organizations that own and operate these
systems have increasingly interconnected them with their enterprise network to take ad-
vantage of cost savings and operational benefits. This trend, however, has introduced
myriad vulnerabilities associated with the networking environment. As a result, the once
isolated systems are now susceptible to a wide range of threats that previously did not
exist. To help address the associated risks, security professionals seek to incorporate mit-
igation solutions designed for traditional networking and Information Technology (IT)
systems. Unfortunately, the operating parameters and security principles associated with
traditional IT systems do not readily translate to the SCADA environment; security solu-
tions for IT systems focus primarily on protecting the confidentiality of system and user
data. Alternatively, SCADA systems must adhere to strict safety and reliability require-
ments and rely extensively on system availability. Indeed, mitigation strategies designed
for traditional IT systems must first be evaluated prior to deployment on a SCADA sys-
tem or risk adverse operational impacts such as a catastrophic oil spill, poisoning a water
supply, or the shutdown of an electrical grid.
Slammer and Stuxnet demonstrate that infections can be inadvertent or targeted,
thus proving the need for added security protections. Currently, many SCADA networks
are exempt from additional protection requirements because the impact to these vital
systems is unknown. This research evaluated the suitability of a Host-Based IDS, the
Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) security agent, and its impacts to the DoD
SCADA fuels network. Research was conducted in a notional laboratory environment on
four system configurations, one physical machine and three virtual machine configurations.
A maximal workload was used to determine if the HIPS security agent negatively impacts
iv
the FuelsManager Defense (FMD) Server or connected SCADA network. For each system
configuration, its network connections, CPU usage, memory usage, and memory paging
were measured with and without the HIPS security agent installed and were analyzed
with a 0.05 level of significance. Measurements revealed no negative impacts to SCADA
network communications or FMD Server operations when all system services functioned
properly. Three minor issues included the need to (1) ensure all system services on the
FMD Server start properly after a system reboot, (2) ensure the minimum FMD Server
memory requirements of 4 GBs is maintained, and (3) properly configure the HIPS Firewall
module to permit communications with desired networked devices. Once these three issues
are addressed, complete interoperability of the HIPS security agent and FMD Server can
be achieved. With a fully configured HIPS security agent, the FMD Server gains the
protection of the HIPS security agent, and the full set of defenses associated with the
Host Based Security System (HBSS). This research shows traditional IT security solutions
can be extended to SCADA networks. Moreover, efforts like this must be conducted to
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Evaluation of Traditional Security Solutions
in the SCADA Environment
I. Introduction
In 2003, the Microsoft SQL Server worm Slammer infected a computer network
at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio [17]. The worm targeted a
Structured Query Language (SQL) vulnerability commonly found on traditional Information
Technology (IT) networks. Even though Slammer did not specifically target the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, the infection resulted in the malfunction
of the plant’s process computer, disabling the safety monitoring system for nearly five
hours, and generating traffic that degraded network communications at five other utili-
ties.
Alternatively, the more sophisticated and noteworthy Stuxnet virus represents a tar-
geted cyber attack on SCADA systems. It has been described as “the most technologically
sophisticated malicious program developed for a targeted attack” [26]. Stuxnet appears
to have targeted Iran’s nuclear program and impacted both the Bushehr nuclear plant
and the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. The virus targeted control systems running
a Siemen’s Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), and utilized four different Windows
zero-days to gain access to computers and search for the Siemen’s PLC software [11].
1.1 Problem Definition
SCADA systems are being exposed to the Internet at an alarming rate. In loca-
tions where SCADA systems are connected to the business IT network, traditional IT
security solutions must be examined and tested prior to their deployment on SCADA
networks. Leverett identified 3,920 SCADA devices connected to the Internet within the
United States alone [24]. Infection can be either inadvertent like Slammer, or targeted like
Stuxnet, thus proving the need for added security protections on SCADA networks. Cur-
rently many SCADA networks are exempt from security protections because the impact
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to operations is largely unknown. Unfortunately, mitigating attacks is not as simple as
deploying IT security countermeasures. IT networks are primarily concerned with confi-
dentiality and integrity of data, whereas SCADA networks are concerned with availability,
reliability, and safety [22]. Indeed, traditional network security tools like firewalls, proxies,
and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) may not be compatible with SCADA; however,
simply isolating SCADA systems is no longer an option.
1.2 Goals
The overall goal of this research effort is to determine the applicability of deploy-
ing traditional IT security solutions to SCADA networks. This research determines if
a Host-based IDS is suitable to protect an United States Air Force (USAF) Fuels man-
agement SCADA network. It examines the interoperability of the Host Based Security
System (HBSS) Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) security agent when installed
on Department of Defense (DOD) SCADA fuels networks, specifically the FuelsManager
Defense (FMD) Server. The FMD Server is connected to both the SCADA network and
traditional IT network. The HIPS security agent executes three different modules to pro-
tect the FMD Server and prevent various cyber attacks. The strategic goal is to protect
the SCADA network from various cyber attack vectors including the execution of unau-
thorized code, denial of service attacks, unauthorized use of administrator credentials, and
unauthorized network connections with the FMD Server. The tactical goal of this research
is to determine whether the HIPS security agent interferes with the normal operations of
the FMD Server and identify what subsystems are affected, if any. The HIPS security
agent must not operationally interfere with (1) the FMD Server’s communications with
the SCADA network and (2) the FuelsManager Defense (FMD) 6.0 software resident on
the FMD Server. Performance measurements ensure the addition of the HIPS security




Chapter II presents background information on the differences between Industrial
Control System (ICS), Distributed Control System (DCS), and SCADA. Information
is detailed on threats to SCADA systems and attack vectors. The differences between
SCADA and IT networks are reviewed as well as related research. Finally, material on the
DOD Fuel System and HBSS products are presented.
Chapter III present the methodology used in this research to include system inputs,
outputs, parameters, and a description of the factors and their levels. Instead of using an
average or above average workload, this research simulates a maximal workload in order
to ascertain if the HIPS security agent negatively impacts the normal operations of the
fuels management SCADA network.
Chapter IV presents the results on four different system configurations (i.e., VM1,
VM2, VM3, and PHYS) with special emphasis on the results from configuration PHYS;
the physical FMD Server configuration that most closely mirrors FMD Servers deployed
in an operational environment. Certain results from the virtual machine configurations
VM1, VM2, and VM3 are highlighted; however, a majority of the results from the virtual
machine configurations are found in Appendix E.
Chapter V Presents the conclusions and future work for this research effort. Next,
several appendices with supporting material are presented to include: SCADA network
architectures, information specific to the FMD Server, use cases performed for functionality
testing, and the results from all four system configurations.
1-3
II. Literature Review
Chapter II provides a brief background on Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems and how they differ from Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), Critical
Infrastructure (CI), and Distributed Control Systems (DCSs). It presents information
on threats to SCADA networks, past attacks, and current network defense best prac-
tices. The differences between SCADA and traditional Information Technology (IT) net-
works are explored with emphasis on testing SCADA security solutions prior to imple-
mentation. Other research in the field of enhancing SCADA network security to in-
clude add-on security devices and traditional IT solutions are presented. In addition,
the Department of Defense (DOD) SCADA fuel system and DOD Host-Based Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) are introduced.
2.1 SCADA
This section presents information on the components of SCADA systems and their
network architecture. SCADA end-point devices, field devices, and components found in
the SCADA control center are introduced. Next, threats to SCADA systems and methods
to gain access to SCADA systems are highlighted. Finally, information on inadvertent
and targeted attacks on SCADA systems are discussed.
2.1.1 Overview
SCADA systems are highly distributed systems used to control geographically dis-
persed assets where centralized data acquisition and control are critical to system opera-
tion. Common SCADA networks include water treatment facilities, oil and gas pipelines,
railways, the electric power grid, and more [34]. Many SCADA systems overlap with the
18 sectors of Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR), or CI, to include energy,
chemical, water, transportation systems, and more [12]. Devices common to SCADA
networks include both mechanical and computerized devices that must adhere to strict
safety, availability, and reliability requirements. Included in SCADA networks are control
centers that perform centralized monitoring and control for field sites over long distance
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communications networks. SCADA control centers monitor and process communications
such as alarms and status data transmitted by SCADA field devices [34].
Components common to SCADA systems include the Master Terminal Unit (MTU),
Human Machine Interface (HMI), Data Historian, Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), Programmable
Logic Controller (PLC), and Intelligent Electronic Device (IED). SCADA field devices
include RTUs, PLCs, and IEDs which collect data from end-point devices like actua-
tors, pumps, or other sensors. PLCs are computer-based solid-state devices that control
industrial equipment and processes. Most often PLCs control system components used
throughout DCS and SCADA systems. PLCs can also be referred to as RTUs; however,
RTUs are primarily used in SCADA networks and not DCSs [34]. SCADA field devices
send data to the MTU in the SCADA control center. At the SCADA control center a
Data Historian records and logs all of the data and is displayed to the operator via the
HMI. The HMI allows operators to monitor the SCADA network and generate actions
based upon detected events. Appendix A illustrates a SCADA architecture consisting of
assets dispersed over thousands of square kilometers.
This research focuses on the fuels management SCADA system utilized across DOD
installations. A DOD fuels management SCADA network is geographically dispersed
across a single DOD installation or Air Force Base (AFB). Field device sensors report
their status to a RTU or PLC. The RTU or PLC then processes the data and sends it
to the MTU, known as the FuelsManager Defense (FMD) Server, located in the SCADA
control center. The FMD Server consolidates data from multiple RTUs or PLCs and
provides the control operator with situational awareness of the entire SCADA network. A
typical DOD installation has a few dozen end-point devices connected to a few RTUs or
PLCs. One RTU is capable of monitoring up to 120 end-point devices such as sensors or
tank gauges. All information generated by SCADA end-point devices is consolidated at
the SCADA control center for centralized reporting.
2-2
2.1.2 Threats
In 2007 Stouffer provided IT professionals with a listing of the potential incidents
ICSs can be subjected to [34]. ICSs can be synonymous with some DCSs, CI, and SCADA
system implementations. In 2010, Stuxnet provide sufficient evidence that these incidents,
or threats, are real and can happen. Stouffer’s list of possible incidents include:
• Blocked or delayed flow of information through ICS networks, which could disrupt
ICS operation
• Unauthorized changes to instructions, commands, or alarm thresholds, which could
damage, disable, or shut down equipment, create environmental impacts, or endanger
human life
• Inaccurate information sent to system operators, either to disguise unauthorized
changes, or to cause the operators to initiate inappropriate actions, which could
have various negative effects
• ICS software or configuration settings modified, or ICS software infected with mal-
ware, which could have various negative effects
• Interference with the operation of safety systems, which could endanger human life
Stouffer also highlights potential goals of an adversary once access to a SCADA sys-
tem is gained. In the past, an adversary was forced to gain physical access to the SCADA
system because it was physically isolated from all other networks and the Internet; The
SCADA networks isolation was its primary security feature [8,22]. To cut costs, businesses
connected their segregated SCADA network(s) to their business enterprise network. The
connection between the SCADA network and business network indirectly connects the
SCADA network to the Internet allowing adversaries to infiltrate the business network,
find the SCADA network, and begin issuing rogue commands to the SCADA network [13].
Leverett’s [24] research reveals that within the United States 3,920 SCADA devices are
directly connected to the Internet, negating the need to infiltrate the business network
altogether. SCADA networks also host remote access connections for use by trusted ven-
dors. These connections present an addiitonal access vector for an adversary. Once an
adversary gains access to the SCADA system, they can issue rogue commands that can
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have devastating effects such as catastrophic oil spills, poisoning a water supply, or the
shutdown of an electrical grid.
Similar to the Internet which consists of a network of networks, the military network
has multiple networks including Medical, Financial, Research and Development, SCADA,
and more. Once an adversary breaches the outer perimeter of any one DOD network, they
can jump from one network to the next. This is possible because of the inherent trust
relationships between networks. The same is true for most corporate networks as well.
Adversarial goals differ and some may exploit medical networks for personally identifiable
information, research networks for high value technology documents, or SCADA networks
to endanger public safety and spawn environmental catastrophes. No matter the adver-
sary’s goal, the tangled web of networks enforces the principle that a network is only as
strong as its weakest link. With the knowledge that few computers need access to the
SCADA network, connectivity to SCADA assets must be limited. Furthermore, limiting
the connections or paths into a SCADA network may deny the adversary the ability to
easily move from an internal network to the SCADA network.
2.1.3 Attacks
In recent years cyber attacks have become more sophisticated. Dacey [17] reports
that the Microsoft R© SQL Server worm Slammer infected a private computer network at
the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio. This worm exploited a SQL
vulnerability most commonly found on traditional IT networks, inadvertently affecting
the power plant, not targeting it specifically. Slammer produced unintended consequences
to the SCADA network including causing the plant’s process computer to malfunction,
disabling the plant’s safety monitoring system for nearly five hours, and generating so
much traffic it degraded SCADA network communications at five other utilities. Slammer’s
increased network traffic also degraded other physical systems to include automatic teller
machines and airline reservation systems [11].
Slammer clearly demonstrates what can happen to a SCADA network when con-
nected to other networks. Even though Slammer was not designed to target SCADA
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systems, it laid the foundation for other viruses to mature and attack SCADA networks
in the future. The more sophisticated and noteworthy Stuxnet virus delivered a targeted
cyber attack on SCADA systems. It has been described as “the most technologically
sophisticated malicious program developed for a targeted attack” [26]. Ralph Langner
has suggested Stuxnet targeted Iran’s nuclear program and is believed to have impacted
both the Bushehr nuclear plant and the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. The virus
targeted control systems running a Siemen’s PLC, and utilized four different Windows
zero-days to gain access to computers and search for the Siemen’s PLC software [11].
Stuxnet had multiple ways of infecting systems via network shares and thumb drives [26],
included command and control communications seen in many botnets, resisted anti-virus
detection, maintained stealth by installing a root-kit, and intentionally reduced its speed
of infection unlike Slammer [11].
The past events of Slammer and Stuxnet precisely demonstrate the threats to SCADA
networks and epitomize the need to employ additional security protections and test them
prior to deployment, regardless if they are close-looped networks or connected to a tra-
ditional IT network. Stouffer [34] describes typical defense-in-depth strategies such as
implementing intrusion detection software, anti-virus software, and file integrity check-
ing software as technically feasible solutions. In the cases where SCADA networks are
interconnected and traditional IT solutions might be extended, traditional IT security
must be tested first because many technical solutions do not easily extend to SCADA
networks [21]. Failure to test these tools can result in disastrous consequences that can
shut down a network, resulting in production losses, revenue losses, or harm to humans
or the environment.
2.2 Security Applications
This section compares and contrasts traditional IT security networks with SCADA
networks. It highlights the need to test SCADA network defense solutions prior to deploy-
ment. Also, the tools and techniques used in this research to protect SCADA networks
are discussed with emphasis on the SCADA fuels network.
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2.2.1 Differences between SCADA and IT Networks
With the rapid adoption of new technologies and lack of emphasis for SCADA net-
work security, it is necessary to retrofit SCADA networks with add-on security solutions.
A SCADA network’s primary line of defense was physical isolation from all other net-
works [23]. Thus, the need for traditional IT defenses like firewalls, proxies, VLANs,
or Host-Based IDSs were not deemed necessary. Because they were not necessary, tradi-
tional IT security tools were not built to be compatible with SCADA networks, nor ensure
SCADA network’s reliability and safety requirements are met. This is precisely why se-
curity solutions must be tested prior to deployment on a SCADA network [34], especially
SCADA networks that are connected to enterprise networks and are no longer isolated.
Wei [37] summarizes four main security differences between IT and SCADA systems (i)
Different Security Objectives, (ii) Different Security Architectures, (iii) Different Technol-
ogy Bases, and (iv) Different Quality of Service. Table 2.1 contrasts the four security
objectives.
Table 2.1: Differences between SCADA and IT networks [37].
SCADA Networks IT Networks
Are concerned with system availabil-
ity and reliability
Are concerned with data integrity and
confidentiality
Use control servers, RTUs, PLCs, field
devices, and HMIs
Utilize traditional IT assets like com-
puters, servers, routers, firewalls, and
proxies
Use many different proprietary com-
munication protocols (i.e., DNP 3.0,
ICCP, IEC61850) which are very dif-
ficult to develop common Host-Based
or Network-Based security solutions
Technology base includes Windows,
Unix, Linux, and standardized IP-
based protocols
Must function uninterrupted without
error for long periods of time
QoS requirements are usually not time
sensitive, do not always require real
time monitoring, and can be rebooted
or shutdown
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2.2.2 SCADA Fuel Network Defenses: Fail-safes
Oil and gas pipelines were initially controlled by mechanical systems, not the com-
puterized devices of today. These mechanical devices prevent the fuel system from harming
people and the environment. SCADA fail-safes protect humans and the environment, as
well as provide a natural layer of defense against cyber attacks. The list below describes
some of the natural SCADA defenses found in fuel system architectures.
Double wall
A fuel storage tank with both an inner wall and outer wall such that if the inner
wall fails, the outer wall contains all of the oil preventing a spill.
External Secondary Containment
Includes dikes, containment curbs, pits, or drainage trenches that are sufficient to
hold the entire capacity of the largest single container in a fuel farm. These contain-
ment structures must account for precipitation events [4].
High Level Shutoff Valve
These valves prevent the storage tank from being overfilled. Once the tank reaches
its fill limit, fuel spills into the overflow line which is connected to the high level
shutoff valve. This pressure from the overflow line causes the valve to close and
prevents the tank from filling up any further [14].
Check Valve
A mechanical device that permits fluid to flow or pressure to act in one direction
only. They are used in a variety of oil and gas industry applications [32].
Pressure Relief Valve
It protects the fuel system from overpressurization due to dirty filters or blocked
hoses. In the event a line becomes overpressurized, fuel empties through a relief line
into a relief tank. All United States Air Force (USAF) fuel lines have a relief line
attached to them.
One crucial SCADA fail-safe remains: the human. In order for fuel to leave the
storage system and enter a plane, truck, or tank, a human must initiate the flow of fuel. A
human must be present to connect the plane or truck to the fuel system. The USAF does
not employ any automated fuel nozzles at this time. Presently, all nozzles have a dead
man control valve to prevent fuel spills should the human become incapacitated during the
fueling process. Even with recent developments of a robotic arm by the Air Force Research
Laboratory, a human is still required to operate and oversee the robotic arm as it fuels a
plane [2]. Also, AFI 23-201 describes USAF fuels management and mandates a human be
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present in the fuels facility to monitor the storage tanks during fuel activities [3]. Natural
SCADA defenses provide safety for humans and the environment, but must be regarded
as the last line of defense.
2.2.3 SCADA Assessments
Many organizations employ penetration teams to find deficiencies in an their net-
work. These teams validate tactics used by adversaries to find and exploit an ICS or
SCADA network. Attackers breach network defenses, gain access to the organization’s in-
tranet, escalate their privileges, and use administrator or system credentials to move from
one network to the next looking for items of interest, all the while exploiting the trust
relationships inherent in an organization’s internal network. Some SCADA networks have
one server that is dual-honed, or connected to both the organization’s intranet and the
SCADA network. This server provides an adversary a gateway into the SCADA network.
Penetration testers are vital in identifying network vulnerabilities and to aid in secur-
ing networks. Today penetration testers are expanding their focus beyond traditional IT
networks to include SCADA networks.
When penetration testers discover vulnerabilities in a network, they determine where
extra security measures should be placed to mitigate the vulnerability and prevent adver-
sarial access. While penetration testers do not intend harm to networks, past events show
that tools used by penetration testers can have detrimental impacts to SCADA systems.
SCADA systems are vastly different from typical IT networks as outlined in Table 2.1.
The following examples demonstrate why traditional IT security tools must be tested prior
to deployment on SCADA networks [34].
• During a ping sweep on an active SCADA network, a 9-foot robotic arm that was
in standby mode became active and swung around 180 degrees.
• While a ping sweep was being performed on an ICS network to identify all of the hosts
attached to the network, the ping sweep caused a system controlling the creation of
integrated circuits in a fabrication plant to lock-up. The ping sweep resulted in the
destruction of $50,000 worth of integrated circuit wafers.
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• A natural gas utility hired an IT security consulting organization to conduct pen-
etration testing on its corporate network. The consulting organization carelessly
ventured into a part of the network that was directly connected to the SCADA sys-
tem. The penetration test locked up the SCADA system and the utility company
was not able to send gas through its pipelines, resulting in four hours loss of service
to its customers.
2.2.4 Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems
Best practice security guides recommend deploying a firewall to segregate the busi-
ness network from the SCADA network [1, 8, 34]. Experts agree with defense-in-depth
strategies and recommend deploying a host-based IDS in addition to firewalls [13,37]. An
anomaly-based IDS is a system for detecting computer intrusions and misuse by monitor-
ing system activity and classifying it as either normal or anomalous. A signature-based
IDS detects pre-determined attacks, or those attacks it knows about. Since there are only
a handful of known SCADA attacks, few signatures can be written, limiting the benefits
gained from a signature-based IDS. This leaves networks using a signature-based IDS in
a constant game of cat and mouse.
Anomaly-based IDSs are not used on many traditional IT network’s because of the
dynamic environment. Traditional IT networks primarily focus on data integrity and con-
fidentiality. Additionally, traditional IT networks are constantly changing by installing
new applications that produce unpredictable traffic patterns. This unpredictability causes
anomaly-based IDSs to produce a significant number of false positives, whereas SCADA
networks may benefit through the employment of an anomaly-based IDS. A SCADA net-
work is the ideal network to employ an anomaly-based IDS instead of a signature-based
IDS. Compared to traditional IT networks, SCADA networks have dedicated applications
running services that are available 24/7 producing predictable traffic patterns [13]. Using
the characteristics of SCADA networks, anomaly-based rules can be written to detect ab-
normal network behavior such as the initiation of a ping sweep, three diagnostic commands
issued rapidly in succession, or issuing undocumented/invalid commands. Moreover, the
implementation of an anomaly-based IDS provides network security personnel with audit
logs and monitoring capabilities, an issue raised by Stouffer [34]. The rest of this section
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presents forward thinking ideas about Host-Based IDSs and how they might relate to
SCADA networks.
Ghosh and Sen [20] compares a distributed IDS to an early warning system that is
able to detect pre-attack activities, share the information with other nodes, and respond
to the threat before the system is endangered. This distributed system is synonymous
with a country’s early warning radar system where individual user workstations represent
radar sites. End-point workstations are usually compromised first, then databases, file
servers, and other high value targets. From a traditional IT perspective, the dual-honed
FMD Server is viewed as an end-point workstation because FMD Server’s Host-Based
IDS reports to a management server similar to all other client workstations. However, the
FMD Server is unique since it is a gateway into the attached SCADA network and not
just another client workstation. If the FMD Server is attacked, it could be interpreted as
a warning sign of something bigger on the horizon. Moreover, instead of simply alerting
users of an attack or pre-attack, the system must be able to fully operate during an attack.
Resiliency is the ability to operate even while under attack. Boukerche et al. [7]
compares a host-based IDS to the human immune system . Just as a human can function
while under attack from a cold, the FMD Server must allow SCADA network operations
to continue. Recognizing SCADA networks have constant applications, services, and com-
munications, the FMD Server should be able to quarantine itself and continue operations.
Meanwhile, any unnecessary applications, services, or communications can be stopped
allowing only the absolute necessary SCADA operations to continue. Once quarantined,
the FMD server would continue to function with a cold until network security personnel
could investigate the matter.
Because the firewall component within a Host-Based IDS may not have been devel-
oped with SCADA devices in mind, a possible solution is to embed micro-firewalls within
SCADA devices. Micro-firewalls would limit connectivity with the device, specify the pro-
tocol(s) allowed, and block all other traffic. Ideally, any upgrades to the SCADA system
that include Internet Protocol (IP)-enabled devices would include a micro-firewall feature.
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The Comtrol DeviceMaster discussed later in this research is a perfect candidate for a
micro-firewall feature. If SCADA networks cannot be closed-loop networks and must be
merged with traditional IT networks, then micro-firewalls present another layer of defense.
This is especially true when SCADA assets are geographically separated and must connect
to the Internet because no other option is available.
2.3 Related Research
While a multitude of security papers suggest the integration of traditional security
solutions in the SCADA environment, such as a Host-Based IDS, no papers were found
reporting on the actual implementation of a Host-Based IDS on a SCADA network. To
the best of our knowledge, no research has been published where traditional IT security
solutions have been deployed on SCADA networks. This is understandable since the actual
implementation of a security solution on a SCADA network could be deemed sensitive
and it may expose unnecessary details about a SCADA network and its defenses. Since
no published papers were found on the deployment of Host-Based IDSs to a SCADA
network, the search for related research was expanded to include other security protections
being implemented on ICS networks. The search revealed the following protections being
deployed to ICS networks including: techniques to segregate the corporate network from
the SCADA network [34], research on data integrity through message authentication in
the Power Grid [33], a case study on performing forensics remotely on SCADA systems
using a traditional IT security tool [10], creating an anomaly detection model and rules
for the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) environment [9]. Finally, a dissertation that found
over 7,500 SCADA devices connected to the Internet is reviewed [24].
2.3.1 SCADA Network Segregation
The majority of the works referenced in this research state that SCADA networks
should follow traditional IT practices where reasonable, especially since many of the
SCADA devices are becoming IP enabled. One of the most prominent pieces of literature
is Stouffer’s guide to ICS Security [34]. In chapter five of Stouffer’s guide he “recommends
integrating security into network architectures typically found in ICS with emphasis on
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network segregation practices.” The first recommendation states to keep the system closed-
looped or air-gapped, and only connect the SCADA network if necessary; however, research
shows that many SCADA networks are connected to the Internet, sometimes without the
SCADA network owner’s approval or knowledge [24]. If the network must be connected to
the Internet, Stouffer [34] presents multiple firewall models to achieve network segregation
including: a dual-honed computer, one firewall between the corporate and SCADA net-
work, a firewall paired with a router, a firewall with a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and two
firewalls (from two different manufacturers) with a DMZ. Stouffer continues to state that
firewalls are not a silver bullet, but a good first step. This research supports additional
security in networks like firewalls; however, the next paragraph highlights why firewalls
are not sufficient and how a SCADA network can benefit from a Host-Based IDS with
application whitelisting technology.
Beechey [5] presents an excellent paper on whitelisting in which he reports on the dif-
ferent types of attacks that circumvent firewalls and dupe the user into executing malware.
The attacks listed in his paper include: binders, installing fake/rogue anti-virus, Dynamic
Link Library (DLL) hijacking, drive-by-downloads, and web application attacks through
Structured Query Language (SQL) injection or Cross Site Scripting (XSS). Beechey ex-
plains how many of these attacks can be performed by script kiddies. It makes more sense
to deploy a traditional security solution already owned by network professionals rather
than purchase additional network firewalls or security devices that require more man-
power to administer and configure. Even though the attacks presented belittle firewalls,
all viable security solutions, including firewalls, must be considered and implemented in
SCADA networks. Indeed, network professionals should utilize every network defense tool
at their disposal to combat the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). This includes network
segregation through firewalls and routers, Host-Based IDS, and whitelisting applications.
When these network defense tools are deployed and properly configured, they can alleviate
many of the attacks described to create more obstacles for adversaries.
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2.3.2 Message Authentication in the Power Grid
Solomakhin [33] advances previous work on the message encoding and authentica-
tion of the Yet Another SecurIty Retrofit (YASIR) Bump–in–the–Wire (BitW) device to
develop predictive YASIR. These BitW devices are add-on security solutions that provide
encoding and message authentication between two nodes in the electric power grid. As
previously stated, control systems are primarily concerned with data availability. How-
ever, without message integrity an attacker can insert themselves in the middle of data
transmission and send rogue commands, such as set power to 10 Mega Watts which could
overload a sub-station and cause cascading effects. As stated in [33], message integrity is
more important than confidentiality because the attacker can learn the state of the system
from the physical world (e.g., attacker knows an open damn spillway message was sent
when they observe the spillway is open). This research improved upon the YASIR BitW
device demonstrating effectiveness with the Modbus/ASCII protocol data availability by
reducing the latency of the BitW device by 15%. This is vital to control systems be-
cause many networks tend to be older generation networks operating on 9600 baud. Like
Stouffer, Solomakhin [33] adds another device to the network which must be purchased,
configured, and maintained by network security personnel. This research effort differs
from the recommended strategy by using existing traditional IT security solutions already
owned and operated worldwide on DOD networks.
2.3.3 Remote Forensics on SCADA Networks
Much like this research effort, Cassidy et al. [10] performed an evaluation using a
traditional IT security tool. Cassidy demonstrated that Encase Enterprise could be used
to perform forensics remotely on SCADA systems using a Microsoft R© Windows Operating
System (OS). Many of the benchmarks chosen in Cassidy’s research are mirrored in this
research effort to include percentage of CPU used, memory consumption, and the effects
of network communications. Cassidy et al. [10] reemphasizes the critical nature of SCADA
networks in which a process control system must run continuously without any downtime
or delay in transmitting control signals and process data. Miller [30] points out that the
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impact to some systems can cost between $1 to $4 million due to the length of downtime
and the importance the system has to U.S. society . Similarly, downtime in the DOD
fuel system can lead to severe consequences. While this research shares much of the same
methodology found in Cassidy’s work, Cassidy performs forensics on a machine after it
has been compromised whereas this research aims to be proactive by deploying defenses
before attacks occur. Cassidy’s research shows the potential for traditional IT security
solutions to be safely extended to SCADA networks without impacting operations.
2.3.4 Anomaly Detection in Nuclear Power Plants
Campbell and Rrushi [9] present research on creating an anomaly detection model for
the NPP. Their research presents the case to detect a potential attack on the system even
when an attacker tries to send falsified data back to the HMI. Their work shows anomaly
detection models are not just for traditional IT networks, but are being developed and
applied on SCADA control networks. Although Campbell and Rrushi [9] focus their efforts
on the Modbus protocol, this research does not look at any specific protocol because the
fuels system utilizes multiple protocols. While this research effort aims to create anomaly
detection rules for the SCADA environment, it must first prove a traditional IT Host-based
IDS does not degrade performance of the SCADA network.
2.3.5 SCADA Networks Connected to the Internet
Leverett [24] found and categorized over 7,500 SCADA system related devices con-
nected to the Internet over a two year period. The Shodan search engine was used to find
HVAC, water and sewage, railway, and other CI networked devices. After locating the net-
works, Leverett was able to map the IP addresses to geographical locations and frequently
use the domain name record to locate who owns and operates the SCADA device, includ-
ing a city, state, company, and point of contact. Leverett [24] gathered results from across
the globe and found 3,920 SCADA network connections within the United States (the
most of any country, with the second-most being 442 connections in Sweden). The need
for SCADA network security in America cannot be overstated, especially when so many
devices were found with a simple search. Leverett searched for 29 types of SCADA devices
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including Allen Bradley, SoftPLC, and PowerLink devices which is not an exhaustive list
of all SCADA devices in existence. This provides strong evidence that SCADA networks
are being connected to the Internet and that network security is lacking for the devices
so easily found. Every DOD SCADA network should already be protected with multiple
firewalls and routers including an enterprise managed gateway router, local installation
perimeter firewall, and multiple internal routers found within an enclave boundary. How-
ever, based upon Leverett’s findings, one can conclude that segregation through firewalls
is not enough and other security protections must be incorporated into SCADA networks.
2.4 DOD Fuel Systems and HBSS
This section details information specific to SCADA fuel systems operating on DOD
installations worldwide and provides the history, development, and size of a typical DOD
fuels network. Material is presented on the DOD’s enterprise Host-Based IDS solution,
Host Based Security System (HBSS). HBSS is deployed across the DOD enterprise and
monitors the traditional IT network. A broad overview of the product and its features are
presented.
2.4.1 DOD Fuel Systems
The leading supplier for fuels automation within the DOD is Varec. The company
was founded in 1928 and has been acquired by various business groups throughout its
history [36]. These acquisitions included two notable businesses that merged with Varec:
Coggins Systems and the UK-based Synergix. These mergers shaped what Varec is today:
a world leader in measurement, control, and automation of bulk liquids during processing,
transportation, and storage. Varec developed intelligent tank gauging systems, Coggins
developed software and hardware to include the RTU 8130, and Synergix developed soft-
ware and systems assisted fuel agents. Together these companies established Varec as the
aviation fuels management market leader. Fuel operators can access data and trace the
movement of fuel at all points along the refueling chain, from its arrival at the fuel farm
storage facility to its delivery onboard the waiting aircraft. Currently, Varec’s fuel manage-
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ment system is installed at over 600 DOD installations [36]. The Varec fuels management
solution, referred to as FMD, consists of the FMD 6.0 software and RTU 8130.
FuelsManager Defense (FMD) is Varec’s mission critical commercial off-the-shelf
solution for air, ground, and naval fueling. FMD manages and controls all bulk liquid assets
in the dynamic environment of a military or government owned fuels facility, including
functionality for transaction and inventory management, SCADA, tank gauging, dispatch
and Automated Data Capture [35]. Fuel operators utilize the FMD software to record and
monitor all of the day-to-day operations associated with bulk fuel management. The FMD
software solution promotes efficiencies and allows fuel operators centralized monitoring,
tracking, and response to fuel requests and system alarms. The FMD software consists
of automated SCADA field devices including fuel tanks, gas stations, valves, and pumps
that report their status (i.e., level, density, and temperature) to a RTU 8130. The RTU
8130 collects the information, processes the data, and reports it to the FMD software.
Both fuel environmental data and transaction data (i.e., dispensing or replenishing of fuel
tanks) are tracked in the FMD 6.0 software application. Moreover, everything that aids in
the fuel process on a local base installation can be tracked with the FMD software. The
FMD 6.0 software application consists of several modules including Dispatch, Equipment
Status, Maintenance, Personnel, Quality Control, Training, Scheduler, Accounting, and
Tank Inventory. Appendix C lists the FMD 6.0 software modules and a description of
each. The FMD solution, or FMD Server, consolidates interactions with fuel supply and
provides fuel operators with complete base-wide situational awareness on all fuel-related
activities.
A small site usually consists of less than 10 storage vessels (i.e., tanks, trucks, or
pipelines), while a medium site hosts 10-20 storage vessels, and a large site hosts more
than 20 storage vessels. Appendix B details DOD SCADA fuel site sizes. Figure 2.1
depicts a typical DOD fuels management SCADA system. It includes the SCADA field
devices and the SCADA management computer network.
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Figure 2.1: A Typical DOD SCADA Fuel Site
2.4.2 HBSS
HBSS consists of a suite of software applications used to monitor, detect and counter
attacks against DOD computer systems [19]. The primary objective of HBSS is to provide
end-point security to client workstations. HBSS is a server client architecture and should
be viewed as a framework. It consists of a server, ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO), and various
McAfee Point Products which are applications installed on the end-point systems. The
term Point Products and HBSS security agents are used interchangeably and refer to the
same application(s) resident on the end-point workstations. HBSS security agents include
applications such as Rogue System Detector (RSD), Asset Baseline Monitor (ABM), and
Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS). When deployed, HBSS security agents interact
with the end-point workstation according to the rules configured for that agent. The rule
sets are defined in policies hosted on the ePO. Each security agent performs its operational
objectives and reports the results to the ePO server. The ePO server consolidates results
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from client workstations across the enterprise network and provides security personnel
with enterprise-wide situational awareness. When multiple security agents are installed
on a machine, each security agent must be properly configured and cooperate with other
security agents. If the security agents are not properly configured, they can cause system
instability.
This research focuses on one Point Product, the HIPS security agent. HIPS con-
tains three modules which must be configured properly to ensure cooperation among the
modules such that one module does not negate the security protections of the other.
Similar to production IT networks, it is paramount to thoroughly test security agent
updates or new configuration settings prior to deployment on an operational SCADA
system. The three modules within the HIPS security agent include: the Host Intrusion
Prevention System:Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS:IPS), the Host Intrusion Preven-
tion System:Firewall (HIPS:FW), and the Host Intrusion Prevention System:Application
Blocker (HIPS:AB). The first module, the HIPS:IPS, is much like a network Intrusion Pre-
vention System (IPS); however, the signatures are specifically tailored for a host worksta-
tion, or group of workstations. Traditional IT networks most often use a signature-based
approach instead of an anomaly-based approach when writing signatures for a Host-Based
IDS. SCADA systems should lend themselves quite well to an anomaly-based approach
because they have highly predictable interactions with devices, computers, or other net-
works. The second module, HIPS:FW, is similar to other software-based firewalls. Because
the SCADA FMD Server has a set of defined connections, only a limited number of com-
puters or devices should communicate with the FMD Server across an Air Force Base or
DOD installation. The HIPS:FW can be configured to limit the connections to the server
and raise an alarm when it encounters malicious activity like a ping sweep or Nmap scan.
Lastly, the HIPS:AB module is used to blacklist or whitelist executable applications. A
blacklist allows the execution of all applications except for those applications specified in
the blacklist. A whitelist denies the execution of all applications except for those applica-
tions specified in the whitelist. Administrators can configure the HIPS:AB to perform an
integrity check via an MD5 hash on the application requesting to execute, check to see if
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the application is in the correct directory, determine if the application is allowed or denied
execution, and determine if the application is allowed or denied the ability to hook [27].
Hooking is the ability for a process to bind itself to another process, or intercept func-
tion calls such as allowing Microsoft (MS) Word to use macros, or allowing the command
prompt to launch another application [6].
2.5 Summary
This chapter explained what SCADA systems are, how adversary’s access SCADA
networks, the types of disruptions attackers cause to SCADA networks, and viruses affect-
ing SCADA networks. It detailed the consequences to SCADA systems when penetration
tests are performed. The differences between traditional IT networks and SCADA net-
works were highlighted and material on Host-Based IDSs was presented, specifically the
DOD’s Host Based Security System. This chapter emphasized the necessity to evaluate
traditional IT security solutions, such as HBSS, prior to deployment on SCADA networks.
The next chapter discuses the methodology used to evaluate the suitability of deploying
the HBSS HIPS security agent to a notional USAF fuels management SCADA network.
2-19
III. Methodology
3.1 Problem Definition, Hypothesis, and Approach
The overall goal of this research effort is to determine the applicability of deploy-
ing traditional Information Technology (IT) security solutions to Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks. This research determines if a Host-based Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) is suitable to protect an United States Air Force (USAF) fuels
management SCADA network. It examines the interoperability of the Host Based Security
System (HBSS) Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) security agent when installed
on a testbed configured as the Department of Defense (DOD) SCADA fuels network,
specifically the FuelsManager Defense (FMD) Server. The FMD Server is connected to
both the SCADA network and traditional IT network. The HIPS security agent executes
three different modules to protect the FMD Server and prevent various cyber attacks.
The strategic goal is to protect the SCADA network from various cyber attack vectors
including the execution of unauthorized code, denial of service attacks, unauthorized use
of administrator credentials, and unauthorized network connections with the FMD Server.
The tactical goal of this experiment is to first determine if the HIPS security agent in-
terferes with the normal operations of the FMD Server. The HIPS security agent must
not negatively impact (1) the FMD Server’s communications with the SCADA network
and (2) the FuelsManager Defense (FMD) 6.0 software resident on the FMD Server. Mea-
surements ensure the addition of the HIPS security agent does not interfere with the
availability, reliability, or safety requirements of the SCADA system.
The hypothesis for this research effort is that the HIPS security agent and FMD
6.0 software interoperate without degrading performance of the FMD Server. Computer
servers have been upgraded multiple times and received faster Central Processing Units
(CPUs), more CPU cores, and more Random Access Memory (RAM). These upgrades
may allow the HIPS security agent to reside on the FMD Server without interrupting
normal FMD Server operations. If these two software packages interoperate properly,
not only does the FMD Server inherit the protections of the HIPS security agent, but the
FMD Server gains the full suite of security tools associated with HBSS. The HIPS security
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agent provides the FMD Server with enhanced protection capabilities including the ability
to defend against certain cyber attacks. Additionally, the HIPS security agent allows
network security personnel to monitor the SCADA network in a more standardized and
comprehensive manner. If the HIPS security agent and FMD software cannot interoperate
properly, other security solutions, traditional or non-traditional, must be explored.
By connecting SCADA networks to enterprise networks, the SCADA network is
indirectly connected to the Internet and susceptible to attack. One approach was to
segregate SCADA networks from all other networks, isolating them through closed-looped
or air-gapped configurations. While many SCADA networks do not lend themselves well
to traditional IT network defense tools, this research effort focuses on one part of the
SCADA network, the FMD Server. While the deployment of the HIPS security agent
to the fuels SCADA network is not a silver bullet, it is one step towards enhancing the
security of the SCADA fuels management network.
To determine if the HIPS security agent and FMD software can interoperate cor-
rectly, measurements are taken on the FMD Server with and without the HIPS security
agent installed. The HIPS security agent is configured using an operational configuration
obtained from USAF network security personnel. If the current HIPS operational con-
figuration is too stringent and negatively impacts the FMD Server, a minimalistic HIPS
configuration needs to be examined to see if interoperability can be achieved.
With the help of Varec personnel, use cases have been developed to ensure the FMD
Server operates normally with the introduction of the HIPS security agent. Appendix
D lists the use cases performed in this research. The first use case models the primary
job of the FMD Server and a maximal workload script has been developed for this re-
search effort. The workload script, based upon the Complete Fuel Transaction use case,
is executed, and performance metrics are collected based upon the affected system com-
ponents. Four different system configurations with and without the HIPS security agent
installed are examined. The results of the baseline experiments without the HIPS security
agent are compared to the hbss experiments with the HIPS security agent installed. The
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configurations without the HIPS security agent installed is synonymous with the baseline
experiments. The configurations with the HIPS security agent installed are synonymous
with the hbss experiments. Each set of experiments (baseline versus hbss experiments)
are replicated six times. Based upon the results, a determination is made if the HIPS
security agent negatively impacts the normal operations of the FMD Server.
3.2 Architectures and System Configurations
This section highlights the hardware and software requirements for DOD FMD
Servers and introduces four different system configurations (specific to the FMD Server)
used throughout this research. Two of the most common DOD fuels SCADA network ar-
chitectures are discussed. The first FMD network architecture directly connects the FMD
Server to the Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) or Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)
via an open serial port on the FMD Server. The second architecture connects the RTU
into the traditional IT network via a Comtrol DeviceMaster. The DeviceMaster allows
SCADA network serial communications to ride over Internet Protocol (IP) and utilize
the traditional IT network. The serial over IP communication traverses the base network
reaching the Network Interface Card (NIC) of the FMD Server. Finally, the notional test
network for this research is introduced.
3.2.1 FMD Hardware and Software Requirements
The FMD 6.0 software accepts user input and gathers information from SCADA field
devices to allow users at military installations and commercial support facilities throughout
the world to track and manage fuel supplies. FMD is deployed on a server, referred to
as the FMD Server, that meets the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Field
Security Office (FSO) Gold Disk (Platinum level) standard. After applying the Gold
Disk security configuration to the FMD Server, certain ports, protocols, and services must
be enabled for the FMD Server to function properly. The basic hardware and software
specifications for the FMD 6.0 Server are listed on the next page:
3-3
• 3.2 GHz processor
• 4 GB of RAM
• Hard disk drive with 160 GB of storage
• Available communication ports
• Standard Network Interface Card
• Windows Server 2003 Enterprise SP2 OS 32 bit
• IIS Web Services
• SQL Server 2000 Express software
• Default applications
This research evaluates four different system configurations listed in Table 3.1. The
primary focus of this research is the physical FMD Server labeled Config PHYS in Table
3.1. Although Config PHYS exceeds the minimum hardware requirements listed above,
it is a suitable representation of FMD Servers deployed in the operational environment.
DOD personnel expressed interests in converting the FMD Server to a virtual machine
which led to the decision to include it in this research. Config PHYS was built in the
test lab and a virtual machine instance was created from it. The virtual machine instance
was deployed to a Dell Latitude D630 Laptop running VMware Workstations 8.0. This
virtual machine was tested using the three different system configurations detailed in
Table 3.1. The three virtual machine configurations are labeled VM1, VM2, and VM3.
While Config VM1, VM2, and VM3 are not the primary focus of this research effort,
their results are included because of the growing trend to consolidate network servers and
free up computing resources. All four system configurations are examined to determine if
the HIPS security agent negatively impacts any of these system configurations, including
virtual machine configurations that do not meet the minimum hardware requirements.
3.2.2 FMD Network Architecture
The FMD Server connects to one or more RTUs or PLCs which are connected
to SCADA end-point devices. The RTU/PLC polls the end-point devices and collects
fuel information such as the level, temperature, and density of the fuel. The RTU/PLC
transmits data to the FMD Server where it is displayed to the fuel operators via the Human
Machine Interface (HMI). Two network architecture configurations exist for RTU and
FMD Server communications. The HMI provides a user interface to fuel operators. The
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VM1 YES 2.0 GHz 1 1 Disabled
VM2 YES 2.0 GHz 1 1 Enabled
VM3 YES 2.0 GHz 2 1 Enabled
PHYS NO 3.2 GHz 8 4 NA
a Indicates the Virtualization Setting found in the system BIOS
HMI is the Tank Inventory module within FMD 6.0 software hosted on the FMD Server
(see Appendix C for a listing of FMD 6.0 software modules). The Tank Inventory module
receives data from SCADA field devices, reports alarms, and issues commands to SCADA
field devices such as shutting off a pump or opening a valve. In addition to monitoring
the SCADA network communications, fuel operators use the FMD software to track the
dispatching of fuel trucks and personnel, which aircraft(s) receive fuel, the amount of fuel
dispensed, and the status of tanks, equipment, personnel, and more. The FMD Server at
the local base installation consolidates the information, generates a report, and sends it to
the FMD Express Server. The FMD Express Server collects data from DOD installations
across the enterprise and parses the information into two parts. Fuel transaction data are
sent to the Fuels Enterprise Server (FES) while other data (equipment, personnel, and
inventories) are sent to the Pentagon. Figure 3.1 displays a simplistic view of the DOD’s
fuels management network architecture. A small subset of the FMD network architecture
constitutes the notional test network used for this research (see Figure 3.2).
3.2.3 RTU and FMD Server Communication Architectures
Figure 3.1 details the functional operation for the DOD SCADA fuels network and
Figure 3.2 details two popular SCADA network architectures implemented at the local base
installation. In both architectures SCADA end-point devices connect directly to a RTU
(or PLC). The architectures differ in how the RTU and FMD Server communicate. The























SCADA Fuels Network 
Figure 3.1: The DOD SCADA Fuels Network.
referred to as RS232 direct connect. DOD installations use this configuration because the
SCADA control center is near the RTU(s), usually within 150 feet, the maximum distance
for RS232 communications. In cases where an RTU is greater than 150 feet but less than
5 miles from the control center, it is common practice to use a dry pair telephone line
with modems on both ends. DOD installations are moving away from the RS232 direct
connect model and implementing the RS232 over IP model. For a modest price, a Comtrol
DeviceMaster can be purchased which converts RS232 communications to IP [15]. Local
base installations may utilize this architecture when fuel assets are further than 150 feet
from the SCADA control center and IT network drops are nearby. The DeviceMaster can
connect to one or more RTUs and connect them to an IT network. DeviceMaster software
is installed on the FMD Server and loads the DeviceMaster as a virtual COM port enabling
IP communications through an IT network. Even though the DeviceMaster is loaded
as a virtual COM port, it utilizes the FMD Server’s Network Interface Card (NIC) for
communications with IP-enabled SCADA field devices. Figure 3.2 illustrates the notional
test network used for this research. It depicts a local base installation with both FMD
network architectures: a standard RS232 direct connect architecture and a RS232 over IP
architecture.
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Figure 3.2: Notional Test Network.
Besides added flexibility when installing new SCADA end-point devices, DeviceMas-
ter provides the ability to encrypt communications using Secure Socket Layer (SSL) [16].
SCADA communications are so constant there is very little difference between unencrypted
and encrypted op codes. For example, there is little difference between a turn on pump
command of 0x08 unencrypted versus 0xE7 encrypted. However, SSL encrypted traf-
fic may be favorable because it transforms recognizable or proprietary SCADA protocols
into traditional IT traffic, masking the SCADA traffic and blending it with other protocols
found in traditional IT networks. This makes it harder to single out devices using SCADA
communication protocols. Providing encrypted communications (i.e. confidentiality) sup-
ports the findings in Mendezllovett [29] where SCADA fuels operators placed an emphasis
on increasing the confidentiality of SCADA network communications. In addition, if SSL
is configured with authentication, message integrity can be achieved. It is believed the
HIPS security agent does not directly affect RS232 communications; therefore, the RS232
over IP architecture is the primary focus of this evaluation. SCADA fuel operators predict
that more DeviceMasters will be incorporated into fuels management SCADA networks
as dry pair modem lines are discontinued and replaced on base installations. It is unclear
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how the HIPS security agent impacts the RS232 over IP communications, hence the focus
on RS232 over IP communications. Lastly, an evaluation of the PHYS configuration is
performed using the RS232 direct connect architecture to ascertain if the HIPS security
agent does not interfere with RS232 communications.
3.3 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) for this research is the SCADA Fuels Protection
System (FPS). The SCADA FPS is the FMD Server running on a Microsoft R© the Windows
2003 Server platform. The FMD Server hosts the FuelsManager Defense (FMD) 6.0 soft-
ware, Structured Query Language (SQL) 2000 Express, Internet Information Services (IIS)
web services, a set of default applications used by SCADA fuel operators, and the HIPS
security agent.
Windows Server 2003 is selected because it is the commonly deployed platform for
fuels management SCADA networks. For this same reason, FMD software version 6.0,
HBSS ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) Server version 4.0, and HBSS HIPS security agent
version 7.0.0 build 1159 are used in this evaluation. While the FMD Server has a set of
default applications such as Microsoft Word, Excel, Outlook, and other applications, these
default applications are not involved in the performance evaluation. The HIPS security
agent has already been tested and functions properly with the default applications resident
on a FMD Server and are outside the scope of the evalution.
Parameters held constant within each system configuration (VM1, VM2, VM3, and
PHYS) during this research include the internal system parameters of the FMD Server’s
CPU, RAM, NIC, and its external parameter of network carrier (RF, Ethernet, Fiber
Optic). While these parameters can affect system performance, they are held constant
within the four system configurations listed in Table 3.1.
The scope of this experiment is limited to the performance evaluation of the FMD
Server with the HIPS security agent present. This includes non-constant parameters
affecting system performance that include the SCADA Fuels Protection System’s, or FMD
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Server’s interactions with external devices such as SCADA field devices and the HBSS ePO
server using the DeviceMaster architecture. The FMD 6.0 software generates and sends
reports to Higher Headquarters (HQ) as outlined in the Creating a .vcef file use case
described in Appendix D.5. However, this research is limited to the generation of this
.vcef file because testing is conducted on a stand-alone network. The primary goal is to
determine if the HIPS security agent degrades the performance of the FMD Server and
connected SCADA network. While the HIPS security agent is designed to protect systems
from cyber attack, the functionality of the HIPS protection mechanisms are outside the
scope of this effort and left for future research.
The Component Under Test (CUT) is the FMD 6.0 software which stores fuel pro-
cessing data and communicates with SCADA field devices. The strategic goal is to protect
the SCADA fuels network by extending traditional IT security solutions to protect the
SCADA fuels network from cyber attacks. The tactical goal is to determine if the HIPS se-
curity agent can successfully interoperate with the FMD 6.0 software resident on the FMD
Server. This includes not degrading the performance of the FMD Server’s normal oper-
ation, including FMD 6.0 software functionality and SCADA network communications.
Figure 3.3 shows the SUT and CUT with workload, metrics, and internal components.
3.4 System Services
The FMD Server, provides real time monitoring and control of various devices found
in the SCADA fuels network. An operator can be physically located at the FMD server, or
connect to the FMD Server via a client workstation. The operator will typically interact
with the FMD Server which monitors SCADA field devices and can issue commands to the
field devices (e.g., shut off pump or open valve). Fuel measurements are collected and sent
to Higher HQ (the FMD Express Server, Fuels Enterprise Server, and Pentagon). This
ensures accurately billing for the amount of fuel consumed. If any piece of data in the
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Figure 3.3: SUT and CUT.
HBSS provides end point, host based security for client workstations and servers.
HBSS Includs the ability to restrict what programs are able to execute (i.e. application
white-listing), limit directories where executables may be placed (more granularity than
what administrators can execute), and block unauthorized connections much like a typical
firewall. The HIPS security agent monitors the FMD Server and reports anomalies found
in the SCADA network to enterprise network security personnel.
Together, the FMD Server and HBSS security agent form the SCADA FPS. The
outcome of a properly functioning system involves the FMD Server operating normally
and the HIPS security agent reporting malicious network activity to security personnel.
Moreover, the system must adhere to reliability and safety requirements. No other outcome
is acceptable for the SCADA FPS.
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3.5 Workload
The workload consists of normal operations performed by the FMD Server. The first
operation is for the FMD Server to continue communicating with the SCADA network and
all SCADA field devices. The second operation is for the FMD 6.0 software to function
properly under a normal workload. With the help of Varec personnel, a set of use case
scenarios were developed and are described in Appendix D. The first use case, Walk-
Through for a Complete Fuel Transaction, demonstrates the most common transaction
performed by fuels operators with the FMD 6.0 software. Furthermore use case one is a
resource intensive operation making it an ideal candidate for modeling a workload on the
FMD Server.
The workload script is developed based on use case one to simulate a maximal work-
load on the FMD Server. The workload script starts the Microsoft R© Windows performance
and logging monitor service, waits 15 seconds and starts Wireshark, then waits another
15 seconds and starts the Walk-Through for a Complete Fuel Transaction. Pilot tests
revealed 15 seconds was long enough for the system to reach a steady state after initiating
the logging monitor service and Wireshark application. The script models four parts of
the refueling process:
1. Request for fuel
2. Dispatching a fuel truck and person
3. Arrival of the fuel truck and person to the aircraft
4. Completion of the fuel request recording how much fuel was dispensed
The four steps are modeled in the workload script with one SQL insert statement
followed by three SQL update statements that record data in the back-end SQL 2000
Express database on the FMD Server. The workload script simulates 5 fuel operators
who input 60 fuel transactions each for a total of 300 fuel requests. As soon as the
last fuel request is completed, the workload script waits an additional 15 seconds and
terminates Wireshark. The workload script then waits another 15 seconds and terminates
the Microsoft R© Windows performance and logging monitor service. After the logging
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monitor shuts down, the script calls a routine to remove the 300 entries input into the





































































Total Time to Process 300 Fuel Requests
(60 Requests per dispatcher)
0 15 30 40 X−30 X−15 X end
Timeline f Events for th  Workload Script
X Denotes the time at which the log monitor stops recording system measurements
Time (seconds)
Figure 3.4: Workload Script event timeline for Use Case One
The remaining five use cases in Appendix D are representative of additional routine
operations performed by fuel operators. No scripts are developed for these use cases, but
each use case is performed manually to verify the HIPS security agent does not interfere
with them. Each use case is performed on the system with and without the HIPS security
agent installed to ensure the FMD Server satisfies operational requirements.
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3.6 Performance Metrics
The most important aspects of a typical SCADA system are availability, reliability,
and safety. The system must run uninterrupted for long periods of time. If something
adverse happens to the system, the proper fail-safes must be in place to protect the
safety of people and the environment. When deploying the HIPS security agent to the
FMD Server, the FMD 6.0 software must interoperate with the SCADA network without
interruption. The following performance metrics are selected becuase they will exhibit a
behavior change in the FMD performance. The performance metrics used to verify the
FMD Server functions properly are listed below.
CPU Usage
The HIPS security agent should not consume more resources than necessary to
perform its job. Overuse of the CPU is defined on Microsoft TechNet as a process or
group of processes causing the CPU to reach a threshold of 85% CPU utilization [31].
Overuse of the CPU may cause the FMD Server to discontinue collecting data from
the SCADA network, be unable to issue commands to SCADA field devices, and be
unable to send fuel transaction data to Higher HQ. Additionally, the HIPS security
agent should not negatively impact any FMD 6.0 software modules.
Memory Usage
At no time should the HIPS security agent consume an unreasonable amount of
memory. An unreasonable amount of memory is using more than 256MB, the mini-
mum memory requirement set by McAfee for the HIPS security agent [28]. Excessive
memory consumption by the HIPS security agent may cause the FMD Server to be-
come unresponsive to the actions listed above. The HIPS security agent must not
have any memory leaks. A memory leak is apparent when the memory of a given
process gradually increases over time.
Memory Page Reads Per Second
At no time should the HIPS security agent cause the system to excessively page
memory. A value of 5 page reads per second or more is a good indicator that a
system does not have enough memory [25]. The maximum threshold for memory
page reads/sec is set to 5.
3-13
Active Network Connections
At no time should the number of active connections between the FMD server and
the enterprise network exceed 30 connections. While the FMD server interacts with
hundreds of devices on the SCADA network, the workload from these interactions
is relatively small compared to a potential Denial of Service (DoS) attack from the
enterprise network. Every DOD installation has a defined set of client workstations
authorized to connect to the FMD Server. Only on base installations where autho-
rized client workstations exceed 30 machines is this acceptable. Wireshark is used
to monitor network connections with the FMD Server.
SCADA Network Response Time
At no time should the HIPS security agent interfere with the FMD Server’s ability
to receive data or issue commands to the SCADA network. Wireshark is used to
monitor network communications and record the Round Trip Time (RTT) of packets
sent between the FMD Server and RTU (i.e. SCADA Network). The response times
of each system configuration with and without the HIPS security agent are compared.
Uptime
The HIPS security agent must interoperate and remain operational with the FMD
Server for very long periods of time. A qualitative assessment is made to determine
if the HIPS security agent causes the FMD Server to shutdown, reboot, or stop
functioning unexpectedly.
To validate the performance metrics described above, all of the processes listed in
Table 3.2 are monitored on the FMD Server. The monitored processes are consolidated
into three groups. The three groups of processes are the Workload, FMD, and McAfee
processes. The Workload processes are those processes introduced by the workload script
which includes a total of 12 processes (i.e., five cmd.exe processes, five sql.exe processes,
tshark.exe, and dumpcap.exe). The Workload processes are monitored to determine if
they exceed performance thresholds. The FMD processes are those packaged with the
FMD server by default and only a subset are monitored for this research. The subset
of FMD executables chosen for this evaluation were identified during pilot tests with the
aid of Varec personnel (the creators of the FMD 6.0 software). The McAfee processes are
associated with McAfee processes executing on the FMD Server. Because the FMD Server
already has McAfee products installed on it, those products processes are monitored to
establish a true baseline. These experiments are compared with the hbss experiments to
determine the true impact of the HIPS security agent when introduced to the system.
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Four system configurations listed in Table 3.1 are examined. Table 3.2 lists the three
groups of processes monitored during this research.
Table 3.2: Groupings for Workload, FMD, and McAfee processes
Workload FMD McAfee
cmd.exe (x5) FMReportManager.exe aviation.exe Framework-
Service.exe
osql.exe (x5) DataDictionary.exe Dispatch.exe McShield.exe
dumpcap.exe FMSystemManager.exe Maintenance.exe McTray.exe







a Processes are introduced when HIPS Security Agent is installed
3.7 System Parameters
The parameters listed below affect performance of the system.
CPU
The CPU determines the overall system speed. Configuration PHYS uses two quad-
core 3.2 GHz processors. Configurations VM1, VM2, and VM3 use a 2.0 GHz
CPU found in a Dell Latitude D630. The type of CPUs found in operational FMD
Servers are typically Core 2 duo systems, or two processors with two cores each. The
systems used in this performance evaluation deviate from operational FMD Server
configuration because operational systems were not available.
RAM
The amount of RAM affects the overall speed of the FMD Server to execute various
processes. The RAM used in system configuration PHYS is set at 4 GB, the amount
found in operational USAF SCADA fuels networks. Configurations VM1, VM2, and
VM3 are set at 1 GB because of resource limitations within the testing laboratory.
NIC
Impacts the transmit/receive speed of packets traversing the FMD Server’s NIC.
Ultimately this can impact the RTT of a packet, causing important status data and
commands to be delayed in the SCADA network. The physical NIC used in all
system configurations is a standard 10/100/1000 Gigabit Ethernet card. However,
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system configurations VM1, VM2, and VM3 utilize the VMware virtual Ethernet
adapter capable of GB Ethernet speeds since the Dell Latitude D630 physical Eth-
ernet card is also a 10/100/1000 Gigabit physical NIC.
HIPS Security Agent Communications/Updates
The HBSS Server (ePO) pushes updates and communicates with the HIPS agent
at regular intervals. These updates or communications may have adverse effects on
the HIPS security agent, which in turn affects the FMD Server running the FMD
6.0 software. To be consistent with a maximal workload philosophy, the ePO Server
to HIPS communication interval is set to once per minute, well above the normal
USAF communication interval of 10 or 30 minutes.
Network Carrier
The network carrier affects the overall speed of data to be transmitted and received
between the FMD Server and other devices. The network carrier for every DOD
installation is unique to that specific installation. This includes the network carrier
and distance the HIPS security agent must travel to communicate with the ePO as
well as the FMD Server-to-RTU communications. This research effort is performed
using a notional laboratory environment where devices are connected via standard
Ethernet or serial cable in close proximity of each other. It is outside the scope of
this research to examine other network carriers such as RF or fiber optic connections.
3.8 Factors
Four different system configurations for the FMD Server are used in this research
effort. These four system configurations and the presence of the HIPS security agent
constitute the factors for this research. The factors and their levels are listed in Table 3.3.












Four different FMD Server system configurations are used for this research effort.
Configurations VM1, VM2, and VM3 use a Dell Latitude D630 with VMware Work-
station 8.0 installed. Configuration VM1, VM2, and VM3 consist of a virtual ma-
chine copy of the physical FMD Server used in Configuration PHYS. Results for
configuration PHYS are reported in Chapter IV since it closely resembles opera-
tional systems. Only items of interest for configurations VM1, VM2, and VM3
are reported directly in Chapter IV. A majority of the results for the these system
configurations can be found in Appendix E.
HIPS Security Agent
The HBSS HIPS security agent is varied with two levels: not installed and installed.
The configurations without the HIPS security agent installed is synonymous with
the baseline experiments. The configurations with the HIPS security agent installed
are synonymous with the hbss experiments. The HIPS security agent contains the
USAF operational configuration as of November 2, 2011. The HIPS security agent
is configured to communicate every minute with the HBSS ePO Server to maintain
consistency with a maximal workload philosophy.
3.9 Evaluation Technique
Empirical measurement is used to evaluate the system. Direct measurements are
obtained from each system configuration during the execution of the workload script. The
test sequence consists of six experimental runs per system configuration with and without
the HIPS security agent installed. Experimental runs, or replications, within each system
configuration are performed sequentially with enough time between replications such that
the system reaches a steady state. The first experimental run is always performed after a
system reboot, and five more experimental runs are performed with variable amounts of
time between runs. Since only one system configuration communicates with the RTU at
any given time, the test sequence is VM1, VM2, VM3, and PHYS. During all experimental
runs the FMD Server is monitored to ensure the following:
• The FMD Server maintains constant communications with the SCADA network
• The FMD 6.0 software functions uninhibited
• The HIPS security agent responds to the HBSS ePO Server every minute
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Results from the baseline experiments without the HIPS security agent are compared
to the hbss experiments with the HIPS security agent installed. The baseline system
performance was validated by a Varec lab technician Subject Matter Expert during pilot
studies and prior to the experimental runs being performed.
Measurements of the FMD Server’s communications with the SCADA network are
monitored using Wireshark. Because it is very expensive to replicate an entire SCADA
fuels network, the FMD Server communicates with only one RTU, which controls a single
simulated tank gauge in the test environment. Since this research focuses on the perfor-
mance impact to the FMD Server when the HIPS security agent is introduced, planned
comparisons are selected a priori. The Tukey Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test is
used to analyze the SCADA network communications. In addition to monitoring SCADA
network communications, the FMD 6.0 software is monitored using the Microsoft R© Win-
dows performance and logging monitor. The logging monitor tracks and records CPU
usage, memory consumption, and memory paging. Table 3.2 lists the processes monitored
during the experimental runs.
The collected measurements form a baseline snapshot of the FMD server hosting
the FMD 6.0 software. After baseline measurements are taken, the HIPS security agent
is installed and the same measurements are repeated to include additional processes in-
troduced by the HIPS security agent. Differences between the baseline experiments and
hbss experiments are compared to determine if the HIPS security agent impacts the per-
formance of the FMD Server. Next, seven use case scenarios are used to measure system
performance with emphasis on use case one which induces a maximal workload to the sys-
tem. Finally, the RS232 direct connect architecture for configuration PHYS is monitored
to measure the HIPS security agent performance impact to the FMD Server.
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Pilot Studies: Performance measurements collected during pilot studies reveal that
the Round Trip Time of a packet between the FMD Server and RTU is not normally dis-
tributed. The departure from normality reveals a bimodal distribution that is positively
skewed. The large peak in the bimodal distribution contains approximately 94% of the
RTT communications, and the small peak contains approximately 6% of the RTT commu-
nications. Analysis of the collected samples confirms equal variance assumptions are not
violated. Additionally, data collected from the performance and logging monitor appears
normally distributed with equal variance across samples. The R language for statistical
computing is used in this research using the gregmisc and sm packages. Further analysis
and results are presented in Chapter IV.
3.10 Experimental Design
Each system configuration executes the workload script six times with and without
the HIPS security agent installed. Pilot experiments revealed that the sqlservr.exe process
uses substantially more memory after the first execution of the workload script. Therefore,
the first experiment in each configuration is performed after a system reboot and the
subsequent experiments are performed without a system reboot. Since the FMD Server is
a production server that runs continuously, it is unnecessary to perform a system reboot
after each experiment. Six replications of each configuration with and without the HIPS
Security agent are performed resulting in 6 replications x 4 system configurations x 2 HIPS
settings = 48 experiments. Baseline experiments without the HIPS security agent account
for 24 experiments and hbss experiments with the HIPS security agent account for the
remaining 24 experiments. It is expected that sufficient statistical basis for analysis is
achieved with 6 replications per system configuration with and without the HIPS security
agent installed.
It is expected that the FMD Server interoperates with the HIPS security agent. This
is a reasonable expectation because the HIPS security agent is simply one more application
running on the Windows 2003 server platform. Because of the strict availability, reliability,
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and safety requirements placed on SCADA networks, results are reported with a 95%
confidence level.
3.11 Methodology Summary
With the rapid adoption of new technologies and few security solutions for SCADA
networks, it has become common practice to retrofit SCADA networks with add-on se-
curity solutions. The approach taken in this methodology is to equip the FMD Server
found in DOD Fuels Management SCADA networks running the FMD 6.0 software with
the HIPS security agent. The HIPS security agent is currently deployed on USAF en-
terprise networks worldwide. Since SCADA networks are being connected to enterprise
networks, this effort determines if the HIPS security agent can be installed and reside on
the FMD Server without degrading its performance. Currently, SCADA networks are ex-
empted from having additional protections like the HIPS security agent installed because
the impact to these vital systems is unknown.
This methodology consists of empirical measurements using an operational RTU in
a notional test network to capture the results of the experiments. The design of this
experiment includes 6 replications for each of 4 system configurations evaluated with and
without the HIPS security agent installed for a total of 6 x 4 x 2 = 48 experiments.
For the HIPS security agent to interoperate with the FMD Server, it must adhere
to the strict availability, reliability, and safety requirements mandated on the SCADA
network. This experiment varies factors consisting of different system configurations (i.e.,
VM1, VM2, VM3, and PHYS) and the presence of the HIPS security agent (i.e., not
installed, installed). The measurements taken must ensure:
• The FMD Server to SCADA Network communications are not impacted
• The FMD 6.0 software operates normally and without interruption
If the FMD Server is able to interoperate with the HIPS security agent, then the FMD
Server and connected SCADA network inherit added protections from the HBSS network
defense tool capable of preventing certain types of cyber attacks.
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IV. Results
The results of this research are presented as follows: Section 4.1 presents FuelsManager
Defense (FMD) Server initialization checks prior to the workload script; Section 4.2
presents the average total time to process the workload script with and without the Host
Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) security agent installed across the four configura-
tions; Section 4.3 describes the impact the HIPS security agent has on the FMD Server’s
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) network communications; Section
4.4 limits its focus to the FMD 6.0 software resident on the FMD Server, not the SCADA
networks or its communications, and reports on the HIPS security agent’s impact to the
FMD Server’s Central Processing Unit (CPU) usage, memory usage, and memory paging;
Section 4.5 discusses a set of operations use cases used to validate the HIPS security agent
does not interfere with the functionality of the FMD Server; and Section 4.6 qualitatively
assesses the FMD RS232 direct connect architecture.
4.1 FMD Server Initialization Checks
Prior to the workload script being executed, FMD Server checks ensured the system
was stable and ready for the workload script and use cases. These checks included ensuring
the following components were operational:
• SCADA network communications
• Internet Information Services (IIS) web services
• Structured Query Language (SQL) service
• Select FMD 6.0 software modules
• HIPS Agent to ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) communications (when HIPS agent is
present)
All FMD 6.0 software modules were started excluding the Accounting, Scheduler,
and Tank Inventory modules since they are rarely used by fuel operators. Typically the
Accounting module is not used in the FMD 6.0 software. Instead, a standard web browser
is used to connect to the IIS web server resident on the FMD Server. Therefore, a web
browser was launched to verify these services were operational.
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All FMD Server initialization checks for baseline experiments were successful. All
services listed above started successfully after a system reboot on baseline experiments.
However, minor problems were experienced after the introduction of the HIPS security
agent. During FMD Server initialization checks with the HIPS security agent installed,
the IIS web services and SCADA communications did not always start properly after a
system reboot. To mitigate this, the services were started manually and the FMD Server
functioned normally. Moreover, the SQL service and FMD 6.0 software modules always
started properly. Additionally, the introduction of the HIPS security agent blocked the
communications between the FMD Server and Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) in the RS232
over Internet Protocol (IP) architecture. It was necessary to modify the Host Intrusion
Prevention System:Firewall (HIPS:FW) module and write a firewall rule to permit com-
munications between the FMD Server and RTU.
4.2 Total Time to Process Workload
Section 3.5 described the workload script executed on the FMD Server. Measure-
ments were gathered while the workload script was executed on each of the four config-
urations and replicated six times. Within each configuration, a baseline of the system
without the HIPS security agent was measured and compared against the same configura-
tion with the HIPS security agent installed. Figure 4.1 illustrates the total time, averaged
across 6 replications, to process 300 fuel requests for each system configuration with and
without the HIPS security agent installed. This research effort is concerned with how long
it took the FMD Server to complete 300 fuel transactions, not the amount of time it took
to complete the entire workload script. Configuration VM1 (bottom) is the most basic
configuration with only one CPU core and one GB of Random Access Memory (RAM).
The white bars represent the baseline experiments without the HIPS security agent, and
the grey bars represent experiments with the HIPS security agent installed.
Configurations VM1 and VM2, systems with one CPU core, took over 30% longer
with HIPS installed compared to their baseline experiments while system configurations
VM3 and PHYS, systems with more than one CPU core, each took 15% longer to process
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VM1: 1 CPU, 1 Core, 1 GB RAM, BIOS=OFF
VM2: 1 CPU, 1 Core, 1 GB RAM, BIOS=ON 
VM3: 1 CPU, 2 Cores, 1 GB RAM, BIOS=ON  
PHYS: 2 CPUs, 8 Cores, 4 GBs RAM, BIOS=NA
Figure 4.1: Average time to process 300 fuel requests per configuration
the workload script with HIPS installed. When more system resources are added (CPU,
RAM, etc), it takes less time to process the same workload of 300 fuel requests. These
results support what was expected from the four different system configurations. It was
expected that the HIPS security agent would consume some system resources. The data
support that the HIPS security agent consumed a reasonable amount of resources, resulting
in a minimal impact to the total time to process 300 fuel requests. The impact is considered
minimal because 300 fuel requests simulates a maximal workload. Under no circumstance
is it normal for a FMD Server to be required to process 300 fuel requests in less than
180 seconds. Configuration VM2 had the worst total processing time and was still able
to process the maximal workload in only 157 sec. It is reasonable to assume that under
a normal workload, the impact to the overall processing time on a FMD Server, for any
configuration, would be much less than the values reported in this research.
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System configurations VM1, VM2, and VM3 are the same virtual machine with
different CPU and BIOS settings. The results of these system configurations show that
virtualizing the FMD Server is an option. This is especially true when comparing VM3 to
PHYS. FMD Servers deployed across the Department of Defense (DOD) run on systems
with four CPU cores, or Core 2 Duo systems. This research effort demonstrated that a
virtualized FMD Server with only 2 CPU cores was able to complete 300 fuel transactions
in less than 2 minutes with the HIPS security agent installed. These experiments support
the possibility of converting the FMD Server into a virtual machine, even if the virtual
machine environment has less system resources.
Another interesting observation is that configuration VM2 took longer to process the
workload script than configuration VM1, regardless if the HIPS security agent is installed
on the system. The only difference between these two configurations is the virtualization
setting in the system BIOS. It is expected that performance of the virtual machine will
improve (i.e., total time to process the workload script should decrease) when turning
on the BIOS virtualization setting, yet this research reports an increase in total time
to process the workload script. This finding warrants investigation into whether or not
the BIOS virtualization setting should be enabled on production systems; however, this
finding is limited to the specific hardware and software used in this experiment: a Dell
Latitude D630 Laptop running VMware Workstation 8.0.
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4.3 SCADA Network Communications
The primary focus of this research is to evaluate the impact to SCADA network
communications when the HIPS security agent is resident on the FMD Server. Wireshark
was used to collect network communications between the FMD Server and the RTU. The
RTU was connected to a DeviceMaster to create RS232 over IP traffic. Using packet
capture data, the Round Trip Times (RTTs) of the baseline experiments were compared
to the experiments with the HIPS security agent installed. The next two paragraphs
address the assumptions of normality and variance when using the Tukey Honestly Signif-
icant Difference (HSD) test. Additionally, each experiment was independent of the other
experiments within each system configuration.
Normality Assumption: Chapter III pilot studies highlighted that the RTT of a
packet between the FMD Server and RTU is not normally distributed. Figure 4.2 shows
the density plot of one baseline experiment and one hbss experiment in Config PHYS.
The density plot reveals a bimodal distribution in which the means of the two peaks differ
by at least two standard deviations. Additionally, Figure 4.3 compares both density plots
and reveals that the presence of the HIPS security agent does not change the underlying
distribution, which appears to be bimodal. This distribution was seen in all baseline
and hbss experiments within system configuration PHYS. The large peak in the bimodal
distribution contains approximately 94% of the RTT communications at 0.001 seconds,
and the small peak contains approximately 6% of the RTT communications at 0.100
seconds. Because the departure from normality in the SCADA network communications
is moderate and sample sizes are large and equal (or nearly equal), the Tukey test is robust
enough to handle the non-normality. There was no change to the underlying distribution
in any of the experiments, regardless of the presence of the HIPS security agent across all
system configurations.
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Figure 4.2: Density Plot for one baseline experiment (left) and one hbss experiment
(right) for Configuration PHYS.





Overlay of both Density Plots






Figure 4.3: Overlay of both Density Plots for Configuration PHYS.
4-6
Table 4.1: Statistical Data for Bimodal Distribution of baseline Experiments
Item b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
Mean 0.01047 0.01038 0.01022 0.01063 0.01048 0.01046
Variance 0.0005 0.0005 0.00049 0.0005 0.00048 0.00048
Stan. Dev. (SD) 0.02239 0.0223 0.02211 0.02239 0.02194 0.02191
Mean + 3*SD 0.07764 0.07728 0.07656 0.07781 0.07631 0.07619
Proportion of Counts 210 225 214 217 211 214
greater than 3 SD 5.8% 5.6% 5.6% 5.7% 5.5% 5.6%
Proportion of Counts 3394 3782 3607 3615 3644 3575
within 3 SD 94.2% 94.4% 94.4% 94.3% 94.5% 94.4%
Table 4.2: Statistical Data for Bimodal Distribution of hbss Experiments
Item h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6
Mean 0.01108 0.01069 0.01108 0.0104 0.01046 0.01065
Variance 0.00055 0.00053 0.00054 0.0005 0.00049 0.00051
Stan. Dev. (SD) 0.02349 0.02292 0.02327 0.02238 0.02224 0.02268
Mean + 3*SD 0.08156 0.07943 0.08088 0.07755 0.07718 0.07869
Proportion of Counts 254 249 252 241 232 249
greater than 3 SD 6.0% 5.9% 6.0% 5.7% 5.6% 5.8%
Proportion of Counts 3950 3993 3926 3967 3942 4034
within 3 SD 94.0% 94.1% 94.0% 94.3% 94.4% 94.2%
Variance Assumption: Tables 4.1 and 4.2 detail statistics collected on the RTT
communications for the six baseline experiments and six hbss experiments. The collected
samples do not violate equal variance assumptions. The tables also depict the proportion of
counts for RTT communications that are within three standard deviations from the mean
of the large peak. Again, approximately 94% of the values in the bimodal distribution are
within three standard deviations and surround the large peak at 0.001 seconds. Roughly
6% of the values surround the small peak at 0.100 seconds. In each experiment the mean
of the small peack is separated by at least two standard deviations from the large peak;
indeed, the distribution is bimodal. The raw data for this bimodal distribution explained
later in this section and is pictured in Figure 4.6.
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Throughout the rest of this section, only findings from configuration PHYS are
presented. Results for configurations VM1, VM2, and VM3 are similar to configuration
PHYS and detailed in Appendix E. Statistical analysis is performed on configuration
PHYS using the Tukey HSD test. First, the six baseline experiments are compared to
each other. Second, the six hbss experiments are compared to each other. Finally, all six
baselines and all six hbss experiments are compared to each other. Additionally, a scatter
plot of the raw data for one hbss experiment is overlaid with one baseline experiment.
The left side of Figure 4.4 shows the 95% family wise confidence level for all six of
the baseline experiments using Tukey’s HSD test. Tukey’s HSD test compares the means
of all six baseline experiments to every other baseline experiment within configuration
PHYS. The right side of Figure 4.4 is the comparison of means for the hbss experiments,
or experiments with the HIPS security agent installed.
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95% family−wise confidence level
Differences in mean levels of Baseline Experiments (sec)
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of means among baseline and hbss experiments for Configura-
tion PHYS
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Within the baseline experiments, Tukey’s HSD test shows none of the means in the
six experiments are significantly different from each other. Hence, the means for RTTs for
baseline experiment one are similar to the mean RTTs in all other baseline experiments
two through six. The same is true for the hbss experiments on the right side of the figure.
Because of the nature of Tukey’s HSD test, based off the t-test, it is not correct to say any
of the experiments are the same. It is more correct to say none of the baseline experiments
are significantly different from any other baseline experiment with a 95% confidence level.
The same is true for the hbss experiments.
Using the knowledge that none of the configuration PHYS baseline experiments are
significantly different from each other, and none of the hbss experiments are significantly
different from each other, a comparison of all baseline experiments and hbss experiments
is made to see if any of them are significantly different from each other. Figure 4.5
shows every comparison between the six baseline and six hbss experiments. In total, 65
comparisons of means for the RTT communication between the FMD Server and RTU are
presented. As shown in Figure 4.5, no single experiment is significantly different from any
other. The Tukey HSD test with a 95% confidence level shows no significant difference in
the system with and without the HIPS security agent installed. Moreover, no degradation
in SCADA network communications was detected between a system with or without the
HIPS security agent. The introduction of the HIPS security agent did not significantly
impact the SCADA network communications in this research effort.
Figure 4.6 highlights the raw data collected from Wireshark. Since Figure 4.5 showed
no significant difference between any baseline experiment and any hbss experiment in
configuration PHYS, the baseline experiment with the maximum RTT was chosen to
represent the other five baseline experiments, and the hbss experiment with the maximum
RTT was chosen to represent the other five hbss experiments. These data sets model
the SCADA network response time which is the amount of time for the FMD Server to
acknowledge a packet from the RTU. Baseline experiment five had a maximum RTT of
0.208408 seconds. Its data is depicted by an open circle and its max value is a triangle
4-9
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of means for all 65 combinations of six baseline experiments
and six hbss experiments for configuration PHYS
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labeled B5. hbss experiment one had a maximum RTT of 0.199217 seconds. Its data is


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparison of RTTs for Configuration PHYS
One Experiment w/o HIPS, One Experiment w/HIPS,
and Max RTTs across all 12 Experiments are displayed
























Figure 4.6: RTTs for one baseline experiment overlaid with one hbss experiment for
configuration PHYS
From the visual representation of the data in Figure 4.6, the data appears sim-
ilar, hence Tukey’s HSD test was performed to determine if the data sets from all 12
experiments were different. The black strip at the bottom of the figure is not a printer
error; this is where a majority of the data points for both the baseline experiment and
hbss experiment lie. It took approximately 0.01 seconds (or 10 milliseconds) for the RTU
to acknowledge a packet sent from the FMD Server and complete the two-way commu-
nication between the devices. Figure 4.6 represents thousands of communications that
occurred over an 85 second window. Both sets of data show a similar band of values at
the 0.10 second interval. Most likely the RTU was performing a calculation and took only
slightly longer to communicate with the FMD Server. Because this is shown in both the
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baseline experiment and hbss experiment, the communication appears normal (i.e., no
discernible difference between the systems with and without HIPS installed). The same is
true for the random values that populate the remaining area of the figure (areas between
0.01-0.10 sec, and greater than 0.11 sec). The maximum RTT values for each of the six
baseline experiments and six hbss experiments are shown for all 12 configuration PHYS
experiments.
As mentioned earlier, the results for the SCADA network communications for config-
urations VM1, VM2, and VM3 can be found in Appendix E. The results for configurations
VM1, VM2, and VM3 show similar trends compared to configuration PHYS. The only
noticeable difference is the maximum values measured in the other system configurations.
Looking at the y-axis, the majority of the communications still occurred at the y-axis
0.01 second mark with a line of points at the 0.10 second mark. Higher maximum values
could be attributed to the type of Network Interface Card (NIC) used on the physical
laptop, or the VMware NIC on the virtual machine. However, there is nothing alarming
or unusual about the SCADA network communications among the three virtualized FMD
Server configurations.
4.4 Observations
The next three sub-sections present the data collected from the Windows perfor-
mance and logging monitor on CPU usage, memory usage, and memory paging. The
Windows performance and logging monitor is present on most Microsoft R© Windows Op-
erating Systems by default. The first sub-section reports the average CPU usage among
three groupings of processes executing on the FMD Server. The second sub-section reports
the private bytes memory usage per group of processes, and the last sub-section reports
on memory paging, contrasting the four system configurations.
4.4.1 CPU Usage
The percentage of CPU usage for certain processes were measured throughout the
execution of the workload script. Three groups of processes were monitored including
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workload processes, processes associated with the FMD 6.0 software, and processes as-
sociated with McAfee products. Since the FMD Server already had McAfee products
installed on it prior to the installation of the HIPS security agent, these existing McAfee
processes are monitored to ensure an accurate baseline was established.
Appendix E shows the average CPU usage results for configurations VM1, VM2,
and VM3. Figure 4.7 shows the average percentage of CPU usage per group of processes
for configuration PHYS. This figure shows the mean CPU usage per group of processes
and its 95% confidence interval surrounding the means. The McAfee values for baseline
experiment three on the left side of the figure appears different because the 95% confidence
interval is so small, it does not extend outside of the window box character. Other baseline
experiments had confidence intervals close to zero, as seen in the figure. The confidence
intervals for the hbss experiments on the right side of the figure are shown more clearly
(i.e., they have a significant confidence interval that extends outside the plot character).
The purpose of monitoring the CPU usage was to ensure that nothing abnormal happened
when the HIPS security agent was installed and executing on the system. As shown in
figure 4.7, the introduction of the HIPS security agent did not cause the FMD processes’
CPU usage to decrease significantly, if at all. This is a good indicator that even when
the FMD Server is at its busiest experiencing a maximal workload, a properly configured
HIPS security agent should not negatively impact the FMD Server or consume more than
85% of CPU.
When comparing the results from other configurations in Appendix E it is apparent
that increasing the number of CPU cores yields more available CPU. As expected, when
increasing the number of CPU cores, executing processes have more available system
resources, explaining the increase in y-axis values between configurations VM1, VM3, and
PHYS (VM2 had one CPU core, the same as VM1). The results across all 24 baseline
and 24 hbss experiments look similar. Even though some values fluctuate in the different
experiments, their confidence intervals overlap. The FMD Server executed the workload
script without any difficulty and the CPU functioned as expected. The OS scheduled jobs
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Figure 4.7: Average CPU Usage per group of Processes for Configuration PHYS
4.4.2 Private Bytes Memory Usage
Similar to section 4.4.1, the average private bytes memory usage for the three dif-
ferent groups of processes were measured. In addition, the amount of available RAM was
measured and included in the following figures where applicable. Appendix E shows a
side by side comparison for average memory consumption with confidence intervals for
configurations VM1, VM2, and VM3. These configurations include the available memory
metric, unlike Figure 4.8 for configuration PHYS. The available memory metric was not
included because the value is well over 3,000 MBs. In order to maintain consistent y-axis
values across all four system configurations, the y-axis in Figure 4.8 extends to 600 MB.
The processes’ private bytes were measured because this value represents the amount of
physical RAM allocated to the individual process and not shared with any other process.
This metric gives us the best indicator of how much memory a process requires.
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Figure 4.8: Avg Private Bytes Memory Usage per group of Processes for Configuration
PHYS
Figure 4.8 is representative of all four configurations, with the exception that config-
uration PHYS has 4 GBs of RAM compared to configurations VM1, VM2, and VM3 which
have only 1 GB of RAM. All four configurations portray a consistent amount of memory
needed for the workload, FMD, and McAfee processes. Even on a system with only 1
GB of RAM, the system had enough RAM to complete the workload script without any
negative impacts to the FMD Server. Confidence intervals were calculated and included
in Figure 4.8, but were so small they do not show in the figure. Complications might arise
in configurations with only 1 GB of RAM if fuel operators use resource intensive appli-
cations like Word, Outlook, or Virus Scanning. However, this is only a minor concern
for two reasons. First, FMD network architectures include client machines that connect
to the FMD Server; therefore, additional applications like the MS Office suite would be
executed on the client machine, not the FMD Server. Second, systems deployed in the
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operational environment closely model configuration PHYS with 4 GBs of RAM as shown
in Figure 4.8. These systems should easily handle more memory intensive applications.
One inconsistency exists across all configurations regardless of whether or not Host
Based Security System (HBSS) is installed, and that is the amount of memory consumed
by the FMD processes in experiment one. Experiment one was always performed after a
system reboot and given 10 minutes to ensure all SCADA communications and FMD 6.0
software modules reached a steady state. The primary reason for the increase in memory
usage seen in the FMD processes between experiment one and all others is due to the
sqlservr.exe process. The sqlservr.exe process is associated with the SQL 2000 Express
database that supports the FuelsManager Defense (FMD) 6.0 software suite. Sources
recommend setting the max memory server setting on SQL because SQL retains memory
and only releases it if forced to by the OS. While it is recommended to configure the max
memory server setting, SQL Express servers are usually limited to 1 GB of Memory [18].
The findings from these experiments support that the FMD Server has enough memory,
even in system configurations with 1 GB of RAM, but it is highly recommended to use
the minimum required amount of RAM as discussed in Section 3.2.1. Also, the increase
in SQL memory was primarily due to the database clean up routine at the end of the
workload script. The sqlservr.exe process increased its RAM usage in two parts. The
first part occurred during the 300 fuel requests. While the workload script executed, five
command prompts iteratively called the osql.exe process four times to perform one SQL
insert statement and three SQL update statements. This caused the sqlservr.exe process
to increase its RAM usage by approximately 10 MB. The second part occurred during
the clean DB routine. This routine caused the sqlservr.exe process to load all 300 fuel
requests into its memory, and then delete them from the database. Once accomplished
the sqlservr.exe never released the memory back to the OS, nor did the OS reclaim the
memory. While most of the memory increase was due to the sqlservr.exe process, about
10 MB was due to the interactions between the workload script and FMD 6.0 software
modules. The clean up DB routine would never be performed by fuel operators, since
they never directly manipulate the FMD Server’s database via SQL code as performed
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by the workload script. This type of operation would only occur during administration
by network professionals or Varec employees. Even with the added memory usage, no
negative impacts to memory were observed in any configuration with the HIPS security
agent installed.
4.4.3 Average Memory Paging
Analysis was performed on all 48 experiments across the four system configurations
to determine if the system configurations had enough available memory. The previous
section discussed the average memory usage for the different groups of processes and noted
the available system memory. While the previous section showed all of the configurations
had enough system memory for all experiments, another commonly used metric is the
amount of memory paging. The Microsoft R© Windows performance and logging monitor
recorded the amount of page reads/sec performed by the system. According to Microsoft
TechNet [25], a sustained value of 5 memory page reads/sec is a good indicator that the
system may not have enough memory. Analysis showed that the average page reads/sec for
all baseline experiments without the HIPS security agent installed were less than 0.5 pages
reads/sec. For this reason, Figure 4.9 shows only the results from the 24 hbss experiments
with the HIPS security agent installed.
Figure 4.9 shows 22 of 24 experiments averaged 1 page read/sec or less. It was
expected that configuration PHYS would have no memory problems because it had 4 GBs
of RAM installed, of which it always had 3+ GBs available. The results for configuration
PHYS in Figure 4.9 support this. Only one experiment in VM2 and one experiment in
VM3 averaged more than the threshold of 5 page reads/sec. It is unknown why this
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Figure 4.9: Avg Page Reads/Sec for the Six hbss Experiments Per Configuration
• When using VMware, the host operating system may have been using excessive
system resources impacting the virtual machine
• Some other Windows process within the virtual machine, not being monitored, could
have executed, using excessive system resources without the tester knowing (i.e.,
Windows Update)
• Unknown issues occurred between the Dell Latitude D630 Hardware and VMware
Workstation 8.0 software
• Issues with the BIOS virtualization setting when enabled
• The system does not have enough memory
It is likely one of the circumstances above caused the two outliers. No single ex-
periment in configurations VM1 or PHYS produced signs of excessive memory paging.
However, one important question remains when considering memory paging: how to de-
fine a sustained period of time. At most, the workload script took less than three minutes
to execute 300 fuel transactions. Some FMD Servers never execute 300 fuel transactions
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in one day, and never in as little as three minutes. The FMD Server is a production
server that runs 24/7 and a three minute maximal workload test may not be sufficient to
conclude HIPS causes excessive memory paging in a FMD Server. However, the results
from configuration PHYS report that a FMD Server with 4 GBs has enough memory to
support the HIPS security agent. While results from configuration VM2 and VM3 are
interesting, configurations VM1 and PHYS never showed any signs of insufficient mem-
ory. Configuration VM2 took the longest to process the workload script (see Figure 4.1),
and only 2 of 24 experiments exhibited excessive memory paging (see Figure 4.9). These
findings suggest a further look into the BIOS virtualization setting which was present on
both configuration VM2 and VM3. There is not enough evidence to conclude VM2 and
VM3 do not have enough memory because there was only one experiment with exces-
sive memory paging per system configuration. To further support this, VM1, the most
rudimentary of all system configurations, exhibited no signs of excessive memory paging.
The results suggest that there is no evidence to conclude the HIPS security agent causes
excessive memory paging, but it is recommended to adhere to the listed minimum FMD
Server hardware requirements.
4.5 FMD Use Cases
The use cases described in Appendix D were performed on all four system config-
urations. Recall that the first use case, Walk-through for a complete fuel transaction,
was represented by the maximal workload script. The workload script executed prop-
erly with the FMD Server in the both FMD network architectures. The only problems
encountered during use case functionality testing were due to system services not start-
ing properly after a system reboot (previously discussed in Section 4.1). The affected
system services included FMD Server-to-RTU communications (FMDataManager.exe and
FMCommManager.exe) and services associated with IIS (HTTP SSL service, IIS Admin
service, and the World Wide Web Publishing service). To mitigate the problem, these ser-
vices were restarted manually. Once started the services operated normally and no other
adverse affects were observed during testing. That is, the FMD Server continued to receive
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tank readings from the simulated tank gauge, the FMD 6.0 software modules functioned
properly, and the HIPS agent checked into the ePO server at one minute intervals. It is
unclear why the system services did not start properly after a system reboot.
The impact of these services not functioning is that the FMD Server stops collecting
data from SCADA field devices and accountants are no longer able to perform their duties.
Most of the time the FMD Server and RTU communications did start properly, but the
issue still remains and must be solved prior to the deployment of the HIPS security agent
to the FMD Server. When IIS does not start properly, fuel operators cannot use the
Accounting module within the FMD 6.0 software, nor can accountants log in from client
machines via a standard web browser. Once services resumed, all use cases performed
normally and the HIPS security agent never interrupted these services or caused them to
stop.
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4.6 Assessment of RS232 Direct Connect Architecture
The last test performed for this research effort was the assessing the performance of
the RS232 direct connect architecture. This FMD Server architecture was only tested on
the physical system configuration PHYS. The FMD Server was configured and rebooted
using the RS232 direct connect architecture, then logged onto and each of the FMD
Server system services were checked. While the FMD Server to RTU communications
came online, the IIS web service failed to start after a system reboot. As previously
stated, these system services had to be started manually. It is believed the HIPS security
agent interferes with these processes during startup. It is likely a timing issue or HIPS is
preventing the services from starting; however, once services were manually started, the
FMD Server functioned normally for the remainder of testing.
Next, the maximal workload script was executed while the HIPS security agent com-
municated with the ePO server at a maximum communication interval of every minute.
The FMD 6.0 software modules were opened and the workload script was executed. The
workload script ran normally and all system services operated normally. The before work-
load script was 1-5%, the during was 30-38%, and after was 1-5% according to observations
made using the Windows task manager. In addition, the amount of available RAM for
configuration PHYS remained above 3+ GB and no signs of excessive memory paging were
observed. Recall the workload script captures network communications using Wireshark;
however, in this FMD Server architecture the DeviceMaster is not used, so no SCADA
communications traversed the IT network. After the completion of the workload script,
all use cases were performed and nothing abnormal was observed. This FMD Server in
the RS232 direct connect architecture for configuration PHYS functioned normally with
the same problem in regards to system services after a reboot.
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4.7 Results Summary
No impact to SCADA network communications was observed in any of the system
configurations except when system services did not start properly after a system reboot.
The physical server functioned normally with the introduction of the HIPS security agent,
supported by the results from monitoring average CPU usage, average memory usage, and
memory paging. According to the results from configuration VM1, there is no evidence
to deny virtualizing the FMD Server. VM1 was the most rudimentary and functioned
normally with the HIPS security agent installed during the execution of the maximal
workload script. These results are promising if Varec and the DOD desire to virtualize the
FMD Server. Configurations VM2 and VM3 warrant further investigation to determine if
the BIOS virtualization setting impacts overall processing time of the workload script and
memory paging. Installing more than 1 GB of RAM is recommended because memory
paging issues were observed in system configurations VM2 and VM3.
As expected, system configurations with more resources (CPU, RAM, etc.) can pro-
cess the same workload in less time. Systems with more resources also promote stability.
This research effort showed successful interoperability of the McAfee HIPS security agent
version 7.0.0 on three virtual machine configurations and one physical system configura-
tion. The most important configuration was the physical system which closely mirrors
systems deployed in the operational environment. Most operational FMD Servers host
four CPU cores and four GBs of RAM.
The HBSS operational configuration was obtained from United States Air Force
(USAF) network professionals and was current as of Nov 2, 2011. This HBSS operational
configuration was applied to the FMD Server and only three minor consequences were ob-
served. The first impact was to SCADA network communications using the DeviceMaster
architecture. This was mitigated with a simple firewall rule to permit IP communications
between the FMD Server and RTU. The second negative impact was the failure of certain
system services to start after a system reboot. However, this problem was mitigated by
starting the services manually. This issue will need to be considered prior to operational
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deployment. Lastly, system configurations VM2 and VM3 exhibited one experiment of
excess memory paging each. This should be mitigated by adhering to the recommended
FMD Server minimum requirements, but should be investigated further.
All results were obtained using a notional test network in a laboratory environment.
All seven use cases in Appendix D were performed on four system configurations with
no negative results so long as all system services were running. No negative impacts
to system services were observed during the execution of the maximal workload script.
Finally, the assessment of the FMD RS232 direct connect architecture and HIPS security
agent revealed no new negative impacts. No evidence revealed serious interoperability
issues when the HIPS security agent was installed on the FMD Server.
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V. Conclusions
This research examined the idea of extending traditional Information Technology
(IT) security solutions to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks.
It specifically examined the introduction of the Host Based Security System (HBSS) Host
Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS) security agent to the FuelsManager Defense (FMD)
Server as part of the Department of Defense (DOD) fuels management SCADA network.
Four different system configurations were examined to include one physical FMD Server
and three virtual machine configurations. Baseline experiments without the HIPS agent
were compared to hbss experiments with the HIPS agent installed to determine if the HIPS
agent negatively impacted the FMD Server or connected SCADA network. Empirical
measurements were taken of SCADA network communications between the FMD Server
and RTU. After the HIPS firewall settings were configured to permit communications with
other devices, all system configurations exhibited no negative impacts to SCADA networks
communications.
Next, the operational characteristics of the FMD 6.0 software were evaluated to in-
clude Central Processing Unit (CPU) usage, memory usage, and memory paging. Each
system configuration was presented with a maximal workload well above any normal work-
load encountered by FMD Servers deployed in the operational environment. As expected,
system configurations with more resources (CPU, RAM, etc.) can process the same work-
load in less time. No negative impacts to CPU usage were observed, and the HIPS agent
never overburdened the CPU. Only two out of 24 experiments with the HIPS agent in-
stalled exhibited signs of insufficient memory; however, these results were only seen in
virtual machine configurations which had the BIOS virtualization setting enabled. The
most basic virtual machine (VM1) and physical (PHYS) system configurations exhibited
no signs of insufficient memory and operated normally. While VM1 operated normally,
it is still recommended to adhere to the FMD Server minimum memory requirements of
4 GBs. The results from the virtual machine configurations shows promise, should the
choice be made to virtualize the FMD Server.
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Finally, the seven use cases in Appendix D were performed on the four system
configurations. All use cases performed normally, except when system services were not
running. These system services include the Internet Information Services (IIS) web service,
Structured Query Language (SQL) database service, and SCADA network communica-
tions services. The only time these services did not function properly was after a system
reboot with HIPS installed. Nevertheless, once system services were started manually,
the HIPS agent produced no negative impacts to those services and never caused them to
stop.
In summary, there is no evidence to suggest that the installation of the HIPS security
agent on FMD Servers will degrade performance. This research highlights three minor
issues that need to be accounted for or resolved prior to the deployment of the HIPS
security agent to FMD Servers. These items include:
• Ensure system services startup properly after the FMD Server is rebooted
• Use system configurations with 4 GBs of RAM, as stated in FMD Server require-
ments
• Add firewall rules to permit communications with other devices to include SCADA
field devices, other FMD client machines, the FMD Express Server, and any other
computer/device that needs to communicate with the FMD Server (this is specific
to every DOD installation)
This research has shown that the extension of traditional IT security solutions to
SCADA systems is possible. Because SCADA systems have such strict availability, re-
liability, and safety requirements, these security solutions must be tested prior to their
deployment. This research evaluated the HBSS HIPS security agent on the FMD Server
of a typical DOD Fuels Management SCADA network. A maximal workload was used
in this research to demonstrate the interoperability of the HIPS security agent and FMD
Server, and to ensure the HIPS security agent would not interfere with the normal opera-
tions of the SCADA fuels network. Using an United States Air Force (USAF) operational
configuration of the HIPS security agent (as of Nov 2, 2011), this research showed that
it did not severely impact SCADA network communications or the FMD 6.0 software
resident on the FMD Server. The FMD Server is able to gain the protections of both
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the HIPS security agent, and full protections of the HBSS suite capable of defending
the FMD Server while under attack. If installed, the HIPS agent could provide network
defenders with near real-time worldwide situational awareness of DOD SCADA fuels man-
agement networks. Furthermore, efforts like this must be conducted to determine if other
traditional IT security solutions can be extended to other SCADA systems and Critical
Infrastructure (CI).
5.1 Future Work
The following items remain unanswered and are identified for future work:
• What caused the system services to NOT start properly after a reboot of the FMD
Server?
• Should the BIOS Virtualization setting be enabled for FMD Servers that utilize
virtualization technology? Is this the cause of excessive memory paging found in
system configurations VM2 and VM3?
• When under attack, does the HBSS HIPS security agent operate as expected and
protect the FMD Server?
• Does the response of the HIPS security agent during an attack negatively impact
the FMD Server, other SCADA devices connected to the FMD Server, or the func-
tionality of the FMD 6.0 software?
• Using the HIPS Intrusion Prevention System module, can anomaly-based signatures
be written and applied to the FMD Server?
• Using the HIPS Application Blocker module, can the entire FMD Server be whitelisted?
At a minimum, can all of the FMD 6.0 executables be whitelisted without impact
to FMD Server operations?
• Address the bimodal distribution of the data found in FMD-to-RTU communications
and apply non-parametric statistical tests (e.g, Friedmans test).
• Using the HIPS Application Blocker module, can the entire FMD Server be whitelisted?
At a minimum, can all of the FMD 6.0 executables be whitelisted without impact
to FMD Server operations?
• Can this testing be extended to other traditional IT security solutions on other
SCADA systems and CI such as electrical, water, and railway?
The primary goal of this research was to determine if traditional IT security solutions
can be extended to SCADA networks. This research has provided sufficient evidence
for the Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to be extended to a SCADA fuels
5-3
network. It is believed that a properly configured HIPS Security agent as part of the HBSS
architecture protects the FMD Server from certain cyber attacks allowing it to continue
operating even while under attack. At a minimum, the HIPS security agent alerts network
defenders of an attack on the system so that proper response procedures can be initiated.
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Appendix A. Commercial SCADA Architecture
Figure A.1: A Commerical Oil & Gas SCADA network architecture. Note: Assets in
commercial system can be dispersed over thousands of square kilometers [35].
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Appendix B. Sizes for SCADA Fuel Sites
This information represents typical sizes for SCADA fuel sites and the various screens pre-
sented to fuel operators in the Tank Inventory module within the FMD 6.0 software. The
Tank Inventory module is synonymous with HMI for all intended purposes of this research.
Small Sites
10 or fewer combined storage vessels (tanks, trucks, pipeline).
• Site Overview
• Tank and Truck Index
This configuration gives users complete management with the fewest screens.
Medium Sites




The extra truck screen would be required with a few - medium amount of storage tanks
and medium amount of trucks.
Large Sites







Screens are designated by location, use and product. A custom tank group can be made
for each storage location, allowing each site manager to individually manage his site.
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Appendix C. FuelsManager Defense 6.0 Modules
Below is a list of various modules within the FuelsManager Defense 6.0 software applica-
tion. It lists each module and a short description of each.
Dispatch
Allows a user to track and record requests for refueling or defueling, dispatch service
equipment and operators, and track the response and service times.
Equipment Status
Allows a user to monitor refueling equipment and inventory.
Maintenance
Allows a user to track repairs that have been performed on refueling equipment.
Quality Control
Allows a user to define and schedule tests and inspections as well as record the results
of the tests and inspections. A user can also assign quality tags to equipment IDs.
Training
Allows a user to keep track, schedule, and record the training needs of personnel.
Scheduler
Allows a user to enter and maintain appointments for Personnel (such as for train-
ing or medical appointments) and fueling equipment (such as for regular Quality
Control).
Accounting
Allows a user to run this application from a web browser to create ledgers and
prepare transactions to be sent to the Fuels Enterprise Server (FES).
Tank Inventory
Provides the user with real-time information being gathered by Inventory Manage-
ment without changing views.
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Appendix D. FMD Functionality Use Cases
D.1 Walk-Through for a Complete Fuel Transaction
This research effort relies heavily on use case number one. Use case number one
represents the most common transaction performed by fuel operators who utilize the
FMD Software. The workload for this research is modeled and automated in the workload
script (see Section 3.5). The procedure below defines how to manually complete a fuel
transaction using the FMD Software. The workload script automates the majority of this
use case with the exception of the last step (i.e. step 6).
1. Click on the Dispatch Module inside of FuelsManager Defense
2. Hit F2 or Click on Dark Blue Icon,
(a) Service Request Tab - select a ref id and choose the aircraft, location = Spot2,
requested by bob, select request for refuel, add any comments if needed.
(b) Billing Info - Will autofill for local aircraft, manually enter for transient
(c) Additional Data - will autofill
(d) Contact Info - Used if needed if you didnt have billing info
(e) Click on Ok, a fuel request has been generated
(f) View Colorful DB Table Col 1 for affected tables/columns
3. F6 or Red truck icon,
(a) Pick a unit (truck), pick a person, and pick the job, click dispatch
4. F7 or Yellow (left) Hour Glass,
(a) Select job and click ok
5. F8 or Yellow (right) Hour Glass,
(a) select the jobs awaiting, input how many gallons were issued, click ok
6. Click Home to unassign driver from the fuel truck/vehicle and hit close
D.2 Export Dispatched Transactions to Accounting
This is usually performed once in a 24-hour period, or every time a new shift comes
to work which is most likely 3 times/day
1. Log into the FMD Dispatch Module
2. Click on Operations and select Export to Accounting
3. Set Date Range you want to Export and click search
4. Once you see the transactions listed, click send file and wait for the Export Complete
Pop-up
5. Click Ok
6. Next, verify you were successful and Log into the Accounting Program (via web
browser)
(a) Click on Ledger
(b) Select our Product JP8 and our Month and Year and hit Refresh
(c) Verify the Total Fuel Moved and you can click on the date to see all the trans-
actions for that day
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D.3 Add a Receipt
1. Log into Accounting Program
2. Click on Ledger
3. Select our Product JP8 and our Month and Year and hit Refresh
4. Click on a specific date to see those transactions
5. From Drop Down select Receive
6. In Receive Window Fill out quantity, Seller DoDAC (6 Chars UY6000), Trans Mode,
Doc Number (repeats DoDAC UY600011321J81, this is a Julien Date after the
DoDac), Final Flag Yes/No, Quantity Determination Method, Shipped Quantity
(same as Quantity) and Click Add
7. click Ledger unless you want to enter another receipt
8. Verify amount of fuel shows up in the Receive column of the Ledger
D.4 Add a Physical Inventory
1. Log into Accounting Program
2. Click on Ledger
3. Select the Product JP8, Month, Year, and hit Refresh
4. Click on a specific date to see those transactions
5. From Drop Down on the right side select Adjust
6. Enter the quantity and Click Add
7. Verify number of gallons shows up in the Physical Inventory Column
D.5 Creating a .vcef file
User account must be in Enterprise Group This could be very taxing on the system, it
is going through and looking for all transactions that are NOT checked inside the DESC
box and it gathers the equipment, personnel, and QC data, and packages everything
together. It only sends new transaction data, and it ALWAYS sends the equipment,
personnel, and QC data. The more transactions you have and the bigger your equipment,
personnel, and QC databases are, the longer it takes.
1. Log into Accounting Program
2. Click on Upload
3. Click on Sending Enterprise Data
4. Click on Create Secure File
5. Save the file to (wherever)
6. Verify the file exists
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D.6 Run Queries as an Accountant
1. Log into Accounting Program
2. Click on Query
3. Click on Load a Saved Query and select on from the Drop Down and click Load
Note: This will autofill our selected fields and create the SQL Query Statement
4. Click on Submit Note: You can perform the same thing as a Dispatcher in the
Dispatch Module. Difference is you are querying the aviation DB and accounting is
querying the Accounting DB
D.7 Running Reports as a Dispatcher
1. Inside the Dispatch Module
2. Click on Reports and select Summary.rpt
3. Set the Start and End Dates and click Submit (Select Aug 1st - Aug 30th, 2011)
Note: You will get an error when doing reports, click Retry after a few seconds
4. Report Shows up and Close out with the X
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Appendix E. Results for All System Configurations
This appendix contains the results for all four system configurations VM1, VM2, VM3,
and PHYS. The R language and environment for statistical computing and graphics was
used to produce the figures in this appendix. The gregmisc package was used to create
some of the figures and have been resized to fit the entire page for easy viewing. This
appendix contains the following:
• Results for VM1
– VM1 baseline and VM1 hbss experiments on page E-2
– All VM1 baseline and hbss experiments compared on page E-3
– SCADA Network Communications for VM1 (RTTs) on page E-4
– Avg CPU Usage for VM1 on page E-5
– Avg Private Bytes Memory Usage for VM1 on page E-6
• Results for VM2
– VM2 baseline and VM2 hbss experiments on page E-7
– All VM2 baseline and hbss experiments comparedon page E-8
– SCADA Network Communications for VM2 (RTTs) on page E-9
– Avg CPU Usage for VM2 on page E-10
– Avg Private Bytes Memory Usage for VM2 on page E-11
• Results for VM3
– VM3 baseline and VM3 hbss experiments on page E-12
– All VM3 baseline and hbss experiments compared on page E-13
– SCADA Network Communications for VM3 (RTTs) on page E-14
– Avg CPU Usage for VM3 on page E-15
– Avg Private Bytes Memory Usage for VM3 on page E-16
• Results for Physical FMD Server (PHYS)
– PHYS baseline and PHYS hbss experiments on page E-17
– All PHYS baseline and hbss experiments compared on page E-18
– SCADA Network Communications for PHYS (RTTs) on page E-19
– Avg CPU Usage for PHYS on page E-20
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Figure E.2: Comparison of means for every combination of the 6 Baseline experiments
and 6 hbss experiments for VM1
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Figure E.7: Comparison of means for every combination of the 6 Baseline experiments
and 6 hbss experiments for VM2
E-8
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Figure E.12: Comparison of means for every combination of the 6 Baseline experiments
and 6 hbss experiments for VM3
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Figure E.17: Comparison of means for every combination of the 6 Baseline experiments
and 6 hbss experiments for PHYS
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Appendix F. List of Acronyms
ABM Asset Baseline Monitor
USAF United States Air Force
AFB Air Force Base
APT Advanced Persistent Threat
BitW Bump–in–the–Wire
CI Critical Infrastructure
CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
CPU Central Processing Unit
CUT Component Under Test
DCS Distributed Control System
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DLL Dynamic Link Library
DOD Department of Defense
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
FES Fuels Enterprise Server
FPS Fuels Protection System
ePO ePolicy Orchestrator
FMD FuelsManager Defense
FSO Field Security Office
HBSS Host Based Security System
HIPS Host Intrusion Prevention System
HIPS:AB Host Intrusion Prevention System:Application Blocker
HIPS:FW Host Intrusion Prevention System:Firewall
F-1
HIPS:IPS Host Intrusion Prevention System:Intrusion Prevention System
HMI Human Machine Interface
HQ Headquarters
HSD Honestly Significant Difference
ICS Industrial Control System
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
IIS Internet Information Services
IP Internet Protocol
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IT Information Technology
MTU Master Terminal Unit
MS Microsoft
NIC Network Interface Card
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
NSA National Security Agency
OS Operating System
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
RAM Random Access Memory
RSD Rogue System Detector
RTT Round Trip Time
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
F-2
SQL Structured Query Language
SSL Secure Socket Layer
SUT System Under Test
WPAFB Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
XSS Cross Site Scripting
YASIR Yet Another SecurIty Retrofit
F-3
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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems control and monitor the electric power grid, water treatment facilities, oil and
gas pipelines, railways, and other Critical Infrastructure (CI). In recent years, organizations that own and operate these systems have
increasingly interconnected them with their enterprise network to take advantage of cost savings and operational benefits. Now, these once
isolated systems are susceptible to a wide range of threats that previously did not exist. Security principles associated with traditional
Information Technology (IT) systems do not readily translate to the SCADA environment. Mitigation strategies designed for traditional IT
systems must first be evaluated prior to deployment on a SCADA system or risk adverse operational impacts such as a catastrophic oil spill,
poisoning a water supply, or the shutdown of an electrical grid.
This research evaluates the suitability of deploying a Host-Based IDS to the DoD SCADA fuels system. The impacts of the Host Intrustion
Prevention System (HIPS) installed on the SCADA networks HMI is evaluated. Testing revealed the HIPS agent interfers with the HMI’s
system services during startup. Once corrected, the HMI and connected SCADA network inherit the protections of the HIPS security agent
and defenses associated with the Host Based Security System.
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